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FAREWELL TO THE QUICK LOOK: 
REDEFINING THE SCOPE AND CONTENT OF 
THE RULE OF REASON 
ALAN J. MEESE* 
The Sherman Act1 forbids only those contracts that restrain trade 
unreasonably.2 By its terms, this "rule of reason" would seem to require a 
full-blown analysis of every contract that purportedly offends the statute.3 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has long declared certain contracts 
unreasonable per se, directing lower courts to dispense with any inquiry 
into the actual economic effects of such agreements.4 Such per se rules 
have always been the exception, however. Mter all, the vast majority of 
business contracts pose little or no threat to competition and consumers, 
with the result that very few are "always or almost always" harmful, a 
necessary condition for per se treatment.5 Thus, courts still subject most 
types of contracts to full-blown scrutiny under the rule of reason, requir-
ing private plaintiffs or the government to offer factual proof that, on 
balance, such agreements are unreasonable. 6 Not surprisingly, most con-
tracts pass this test. 
* Professor of Law and Fellow, Institute of Bill of Rights Law, William and Mary School 
of Law. The author thanks Andrew Gavil for helpful comments on a previous draft. Dawn 
Figueiras, Christopher Channel, and Louis Campbell provided helpful research assistance. 
The William and Mary School of Law provided a summer research grant in partial support 
of this project. Felicia Burton assisted in preparation of the manuscript. 
I 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7. 
2 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I, 62-64 (1911). 
3 See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-61 (1933); Chicago 
Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,238 (1918). 
4 See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); United States v. 
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940); id. at 224-25 n.59. 
5 See Northern Pacific Railway, 356 U.S. at 5. 
6 See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988) (stating that, 
under the rule of reason, '"the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in 
deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable 
restraint on competition"') (quoting Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 
36, 49 (1977)). 
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In NCAA v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma7 the Supreme 
Court suggested a "third way," a sort of middle ground between "per 
se" and rule of reason analysis. At issue was the NCAA's process of 
determining how many college football games would be broadcast and 
which networks would broadcast them. Standing alone, such restraints 
would have been per se unlawful, and the lower courts treated them as 
such.8 The restraints did not stand alone, however, but were instead 
ancillary to a joint venture that produced college football. Nevertheless, 
the Justices suggested that, even though ancillary, such restraints would 
be unlawful per se under then-prevailing precedent.9 At the same time, 
the Court found that some horizontal restraints were plainly necessary 
to create the product in the first instance. For instance, the Court noted 
that a horizontal agreement among member schools not to pay athletes 
a salary was necessary to the very existence of the product-amateur 
college football. 10 As a result, the Court said, per se treatment of the 
broadcasting restrictions was inappropriate. 11 
Ordinarily, rejection of per se treatment would have required full-
blown rule of reason analysis and, with it, a requirement that the plaintiffs 
offer concrete proof of anticompetitive effects. 12 Not surprisingly, then, 
the defendants argued that plaintiffs were compelled to establish anti-
competitive effects by proving that the NCAA possessed power in some 
relevant market. 13 Nonetheless, the Court rejected such a full-blown 
approach, holding that plaintiffs need not offer any evidence of anticom-
petitive effect by proof of market power or otherwise. 14 By their very 
7 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
8 See Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147, 1152 (lOth Cir. 1983), 
affd, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
9 See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 99-100. 
10 /d. at 102. 
11 See id. at 101 ("What is critical is that this case involves an industry in which horizontal 
restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all."). Cf Broadcast 
Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 2I-24 (1979) (BMI) (holding that blanket license 
should be analyzed under the rule of reason because such horizontal cooperation was 
necessary to create a new product}. 
12 See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,49 & n.15 (1977) (stating 
that, under the rule of reason, "the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case 
in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable 
restraint on competition") (citing Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 
238 (1918) ); 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW~ 1503, at 377 (1986) ("[T]he plaintiff 
alleging an unreasonable restraint must show a significant restraint on competition and 
... this ordinarily requires definition of a product and geographic market, an assessment 
of the parties' roles in that market, and proof of such other market circumstances as bear 
on competitive effects."). 
13 See Brief for the NCAA at 33-46, NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 
U.S. 85 (1984) (No. 83-271). 
14 See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 109-10. 
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nature, the Court said, the restraints in question posed a significant risk 
of anticompetitive harm with the result that proof of their existence 
was itself sufficient to establish a prima facie case, casting a burden of 
justification on the defendants. 15 At any rate, the Court continued, the 
district court had properly found that the defendants did, in fact possess 
market power, and that the restraints had reduced output. 16 
Important scholars have endorsed NCAA's approach, including the 
"quick look" approach to examining restraints on price or output, and 
Willard Tom writes in that tradition for this Symposium. 17 Moreover, the 
15 /d. at 106-11. 
16 See id. at 111 ("As a factual matter, it is evident that petitioner does possess market 
power."). One could also read FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986), 
as applying a "quick look" approach. See id. at 460. It should be noted, however, that the 
Court went on to sustain the Commission's "finding of actual, sustained adverse effects 
on competition." See id. at 461. 
One could argue that the NCAA Court's determination that the defendants possessed 
market power transformed the language stating that no such power was necessary into 
dicta. However, the Supreme Court and most lower courts have read the decision as 
holding that, without more, proof that an agreement sets prices or output ipso facto 
establishes a prima facie case under the rule of reason. See California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 
526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999); United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669, 672-74 (3d Cir. 
1993); Chicago Prof! Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National Basketball Ass'n, 961 F.2d 667, 
674-76 (7th Cir. 1992). But see Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1020-21 (lOth Cir.) (quick 
look shifts burden to defendant upon proof that agreement actually affects prices), cert. 
denied, 525 U.S. 822 ( 1998). This essay will assume that California Dental Association and 
similar decisions properly characterized the holding of NCAA. 
Moreover, some language in NCAA seems to rest upon the district court's finding that 
the restraints had, in fact, reduced the number of games broadcast, thereby suggesting 
that the Court deemed some proof of anticompetitive effects necessary before shifting 
the burden of justification to the defendant. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 107-08. At any rate, 
in responding to defendants' plea for proof of market power, the Court made it clear 
that it would not even have required proof of anticompetitive effects in the first instance. 
As a matter of law, the absence of proof of market power does not justifY a naked 
restriction on price or output. To the contrary, when there is an agreement not 
to compete in terms of price or output, "no elaborate industry analysis is required 
to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an agreement." 
/d. at 109 (emphasis added) (quoting National Soc'y of Prof! Eng'rs, 435 U.S. 679, 692 
(1978)). See Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership, 961 F.2d at 674 (reading this passage 
"as holding that any agreement to reduce output measured by the number of televised 
games requires some justification") (emphasis added)). Further, the Court quoted with 
approval Professor Areeda's statement that, in some cases, a trial court can determine 
that a restraint is anticompetitive "even without a trial." See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 110 n.39 
(quoting PHILLIP AlmEDA, THE RULE OF REASON IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 37-38 (Federal 
Judicial Center 1981)); see also California Dental Association, 526 U.S. at 770 (quick look 
applies when "an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could 
conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on 
customers and markets"); Brown University, 5 F.3d at 672-74 (quick look test announced 
in NCAA does not involve proof of actual adverse effects). 
17 See Willard K. Tom & Chul Pak, A Flexible Rule of Reason, 68 ANTITRUST LJ. 391 (2000) 
(endorsing quick look approach for certain horizontal restraints); HERBERT HovENKAMP, 
FEDEKAL ANTITRUST POLICY 262-65 (2d ed. 1999); AAEEDA, supra note 16, at 37-38. 
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enforcement agencies took the "quick look" to heart, announcing that 
private parties bear the burden of explaining any restraint that is "inher-
ently suspect," i.e., that, standing alone, would be deemed per se unlaw-
ful.18 Like NCAA, these scholars and officials would require private parties 
to explain any such restraint, even those that are ancillary to otherwise 
legitimate ventures, without first requiring any proof that the restraints 
produce anticompetitive effects. 19 
This essay is a dissent from this conventional wisdom. As argued below, 
the quick look is an artifact of a bygone Populist era in which courts 
and the enforcement agencies protected the freedom of traders from 
contractual restraints deemed "monopolistic" by the applied price theory 
school of industrial organization. Developments in economic theory 
have cast new light on the purpose and function of many restraints, 
demonstrating that various contracts once deemed "coercive" or "monop-
olistic" are in fact examples of voluntary integration that improve social 
18 Joel I. Klein, A Stepwise Approach to Antitrust Review of Horizontal Agreements, 
Address to the ABA Antitrust Section Semi-Annual Fall Program (Nov. 7, 1996); Massachu-
setts Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549, 603-604 (1988). Recently, however, 
the Federal Trade Commission appeared to back away from the quick look, opining that 
Supreme Court precedent only recognizes two modes of analysis: per se and rule of reason. 
See California Dental Ass'n, 121 F.T.C. 190,299 (1996), affd, 128 F.3d 720 (9th Cir. 1997), 
vacated, 526 U.S. 756 (1999); California Dental Ass'n, 121 F.T.C. at 307-22 (finding proof 
of anticompetitive harm before examining possible efficiencies); see also Joseph Kattan, 
The Role of Efficiency Considerations in the Federal Trade Commission's Antitrust Analysis, 64 
ANTITRUST LJ. 613,628-32 (1996) (contending that the Commission's decision in Califor-
nia Dental Association effectively abandoned the approach outlined in Massachusetts Board 
of optometry). But see Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice Guidelines 
for Collaborations Among Competitors§ 3.3 (Apr. 7, 2000), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. 
(CCH) ~ 13,161, at 20,856 (absent overriding benefits, agencies will challenge agreements 
"where the likelihood of anticompetitive harm is evident from the nature of the agreement") 
(emphasis added)); id. at § 3.3 n.24, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. ( CCH) at 20,856 n.24 
(quoting NCAA for proposition that rule of reason "can sometimes be applied in the 
twinkling of an eye," see NCAA, 468 U.S. at 110 n.39). 
19 See Klein, supra note 18, at 3 (stating Antitrust Division's view that the existence of a 
horizontal restraint "that directly limits competition on price or output between or among 
competitors" casts upon the parties to the restraint a burden of coming forward with 
proof of procompetitive virtues); Massachusetts Board, 110 F.T.C. at 604. See also Guidelines 
for Collaborations Among Competitors, supra note 18, § 3.3 (stating that "nature of an 
agreement" can itself render an arrangement presumptively unlawful). One could read 
Mr. Klein's reference to "price or output" as a limitation on the scope of the quick look. 
However, he subsequently makes it clear that the Division would also apply the quick look 
to horizontal ancillary territorial restraints. See Klein, supra note 18, at 4 (stating that the 
Division would apply the quick look to the territorial restraints condemned in United States 
v. Topco, 405 U.S. 596 (1972)). 
Antitrust afficionados may see parallels between the Division's focus on restraints that 
"directly limit" competition and early case law holding that the Sherman Act only outlaws 
"direct restraints." See, e.g., United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 568 (1898). 
This similarity is purely semantic, however. The "direct restrictions" presumed unlawful 
by the Division would include numerous restraints treated as "indirect" by early case law. 
See id. at 567-68 (ancillary restraints are indirect and thus beyond the scope of the Act). 
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welfare. Thus, attempts to protect "trader freedom" under the aegis of 
the antitrust laws have come at a cost-a cost borne by traders and 
consumers alike. Moreover, significant historical research has cast doubt 
on the assertion that "liberty from contract" or "trader freedom" is 
of independent normative significance under the Sherman Act. Taken 
together, these developments suggest that courts should accord full-
blown rule of reason treatment to any restraint that is plausibly procom-
petitive, even if the restraint appears to affect price or output. This, of 
course, is the same approach taken when analyzing horizontal mergers, 
which by their nature eliminate price competition between the merging 
parties. Adherence to the quick look doctrine in the face of these argu-
ments reflects undue solicitude for trader freedom, unjustified hostility 
toward contractual integration, or both. 
Elimination of the quick look as a separate mode of analysis will 
require more careful delineation of the boundary between contracts 
deemed unlawful per se and those analyzed under the rule of reason. 
At the same time, courts and enforcement agencies will have to determine 
just what sort of evidence is necessary to establish a prima facie case 
under the rule of reason. The approach taken by this article suggests 
answers to each of these questions. First, where horizontal restraints are 
concerned, courts should not reserve the rule of reason for those 
restraints that are "ancillary" to some related enterprise or sale transac-
tion. Instead, courts should apply the rule of reason to any restraint that 
arguably produces economic benefits, regardless whether those benefits 
are parasitic on some larger enterprise. 
Further, when conducting this analysis, courts should not dispense with 
definitive proof that a challenged restraint can produce anticompetitive 
harm. Instead, plaintiffs who challenge horizontal restraints under the 
rule of reason should bear the same burden currently shouldered by 
those who challenge horizontal mergers: definition of a relevant market 
and proof that the defendant possesses or has access to market power 
sufficient to work competitive harm. So-called "direct proof' of anti com-
petitive effects, such as evidence that a restraint has increased prices 
above the status quo ante, should not suffice to establish a prima facie case, 
as such proof is equally consistent with a conclusion that the restraint is 
procompetitive. Indeed, reliance on such direct proof again reflects the 
influence of applied price theory, resting, as it does, on a definition of 
"competition" that does not recognize the sort of market failures that 
justify numerous contractual restraints. 
Part I of this article reviews antitrust doctrine as it stood before the 
modern era. During the pre-modern Populist era, it is shown, antitrust 
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jurisprudence reflected the influence of the applied price theory tradi-
tion of industrial organization as well concern for the "freedom" of 
traders from contractual restraints. Part II describes the rejection of the 
principles that informed the Populist era in decisions that ushered in 
the modern era of antitrust analysis. Part III argues that the quick look 
as articulated by NCAA and the enforcement agencies is in fact a throw-
back to the pre-modern Populist era resting, as it does, on price-theoretic 
assumptions that drive the quick look's hostility toward horizontal 
restraints. Such assumptions, it is argued, have no place in this modern 
era, and horizontal restraints not deemed unlawful per se should be 
treated like horizontal mergers and accorded full-blown rule of reason 
scrutiny. Part IV suggests that rule of reason treatment should not be 
reserved for horizontal restraints that are "ancillary" to some other trans-
action or venture, and also argues that plaintiffs challenging such 
restraints under the rule of reason should bear the same burden currently 
shouldered by those who challenge horizontal mergers, namely, proof 
that market structure and concentration support the plaintiffs account 
of how the challenged restraint will harm consumers. 
I. TRADER FREEDOM AND PRICE THEORY: 
A ONE-TWO PUNCH 
For some time, per se rules ruled the roost. Tying contracts, maximum 
and minimum resale price maintenance, certain exclusive dealing con-
tracts, exclusive territories-all were deemed so harmful and so utterly 
lacking in redeeming virtue as to justify summary condemnation.20 Two 
20 See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 151-53 (1968) (maximum resale price 
maintenance); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365,379 (1968) (exclusive 
territories); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958) (tying contracts); 
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) (exclusive dealing). To be sure, 
the Court required proof of market power before invoking the per se rule against tying. 
See Northern Pacific Railway, 356 U.S. at 6-7, 11. Yet, the Court rendered this requirement 
meaningless, finding, for instance, that the ability to obtain agreement to a tie was itself 
evidence of market power! See id. at 7-8 ("The very existence of this host of tying arrange-
ments is itself compelling evidence of defendant's great power .... "); Fortner Enters., 
Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503-04 (1969); see also United States v. 
Loew's, Inc. 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962) (finding that possession of a copyright created presump-
tion of market power); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 49 (9th Cir. 1971) 
(finding market power based on possession of attractive trademark). 
Of course, the per se rule against minimum price fixing predates the Populist era, 
announced as it was in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. john D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 
( 1911). While Dr. Miles reflected an ignorance of the possible economic benefits of vertical 
restraints, it seems unlikely that the decision accorded "liberty from contract" or "trader 
freedom" any independent normative significance. Other decisions of the period construed 
the Sherman Act narrowly, in light of liberty of contract, and Dr. Miles apparently rested 
on a belief that the contract before the Court was, in effect, a dealer cartel of the sort 
that injured consumers and thus fell outside the protection of liberty of contract. !d. at 
408-09. See generally Alan J. Meese, Liberty and Antitrust in the Formative Era, 79 B.U. L. REv. 
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factors converged to bolster the hegemony of per se rules during anti-
trust's Populist era. First, courts adopted an expansive and controversial 
account of the "harm" cognizable under the antitrust laws. More pre-
cisely, courts treated "liberty from contract" and "trader freedom" as 
values of independent significance under the antitrust laws, treating 
contractual restrictions on such freedom as a "harm" for purposes of 
applying the per se rule. 21 Second, courts undervalued the benefits of 
contractual integration, viewing most distribution restraints, for instance, 
as attempts to extend a manufacturer's market power or otherwise abuse 
its distributors.22 This "inhospitality tradition" of antitrust flowed natu-
rally from the dominant economic paradigm of the time, neoclassical 
price theory, which viewed the firm as a production function and only 
recognized "technological" efficiencies.23 By their nature, these efficien-
1, 36 (1999) [hereinafter Meese, Liberty and Antitrust] (formative era case law reflected 
concern for liberty of contract); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61-62 
(1911) (reading Sherman Act in light of liberty of contract); United States v. American 
Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911) (Sherman Act "did not forbid or restrain the power 
to make normal and useful contracts to further trade by resorting to all normal methods"). 
21 See Alln'echt, 390 U.S. at 152 ("[A]greements to fix maximum prices, 'no less than those 
to fix minimum prices, cripple the freedom of traders and thereby restrain their ability 
to sell in accordance with their judgment."') (quoting Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. 
Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951)); FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 
321 (1966) (holding that exclusive dealing contract "conflicts with the central policy of 
both § 1 of the Sherman Act and§ 3 of the Clayton Act against contracts which take away 
freedom of purchasers to buy in an open market"); K.lor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 
Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 (1959) (declaring group boycott per se unlawful absent proof of 
harm to consumers because the combination "takes from K.lor's its freedom to buy appli-
ances in an open competitive market" and "deprives the manufacturers and distributors 
of their freedom to sell to Klor's"); Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 
U.S. 457, 467-68 (1941); see also Thomas E. Kauper, The Warren Court and the Antitrust 
Laws: of Economics, Populism, and Cynicism, 67 MICH. L. REv. 325, 332 (1968) (arguing that 
the Warren Court was primarily concerned with "equality of opportunity, free access to 
markets by competing sellers, and complete freedom of choice by buyers"). 
22 See, e.g., Alln'echt, 390 U.S. at 152-53; Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts 
Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 141 (1968) (holding that various vertical restraints could not be in 
dealers' self-interest, and were instead "thrust upon them" by franchisor); Brown Shoe Co., 
384 U.S. at 321; Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 16 (1964). 
23 See Alan J. Meese, Price Theory and Vertical Restraints: A Misunderstood Relation, 45 UCLA 
L. REv. 143, 183-95 (1997) [hereinafter Meese, Price Theory] (describing various price-
theoretic assumptions underlying Populist approach to vertical restraints); Oliver William-
son, Technology And Transaction Cost Economics, 10 J. EcoN. BEHAV. & 0RG. 355, 356 (1988) 
(asserting that, under the price-theoretic paradigm, "the 'natural' boundaries of the firm 
were thought to be defined by engineering considerations"); OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE 
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 7 (1985) (describing assumptions of neoclassical 
price theory and their influence on industrial organization); id. at 19-26, 370-73 (describ-
ing influence of this paradigm on antitrust thinking); Ronald H. Coase, Industrial Organiza-
tion: A Proposal For Research, reprinted in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 57, 60-61 
(Ronald H. Coase ed., 1988) (describing industrial organization's exclusive focus on price 
theory); Frank H. Easterbrook, Is There a Ratchet in Antitrust Law?, 60 TEx. L. REv. 705, 715 
( 1982) (describing "inhospitality tradition" of antitrust law); George Stigler, The Division of 
Labor Is Limited by the Extent of the Market, 59]. Pot.. EcoN. 185, 185 (1951) (noting that 
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cies could only be realized within the boundaries of the firm, before 
sale of a product and the accompanying passage of title. 24 Within this 
tradition, contractual restraints on purchasers after title passed were 
viewed as an anomaly-inexplicable except on the hypothesis of "lever-
age" or other forms of exclusion. 25 Taken together these two factors-
economists "have generally treated as a (technological?) datum the problem of what the 
firm does-what governs its range of activities or functions"). See also HovENKAMP, supra 
note 17, at 42-45 (describing influence of structure-conduct-performance paradigm on 
antitrust thinking during Populist era). 
24 Richard N. Langlois, Transaction Costs, Production Costs, and the Passage of Time, in 
COASEAN ECONOMICS: LAW AND ECONOMICS AND THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 1, 
2-4 (Steven G. Medema ed., 1998) (describing technological focus of so-called Pigovian 
price theory); WILLIAMSON, supra note 23, at 370-71 (price theory's hostility toward vertical 
restraints "was buttressed by the view that true economies take a technological form, [and] 
hence are fully realized within firms. Since there is nothing to be gained by introducing 
nonstandard terms into market-mediated exchange, the use of contract restraints was 
presumed to have anticompetitive purpose and effect."). See also JoE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 381 (1968) (contending that "economies of integration generally involve 
a physical or technical integration of the processes in a single plant. A classic case is that 
of integrating iron-making and steel-making to effect a saving in fuel costs by eliminating 
a reheating of the iron before it is fed to a steel furnace."). Professor Bain also concluded 
that integration into distribution was likely anticompetitive: 
[t]he trained observer tends to form a considerable suspicion from casual observa-
tion that there is a good deal of vertical integration which, although not actually 
uneconomical, is also not justified on the basis of any cost savings. This is appar-
ently true in particular of the integration of distributive facilities by manufacturing 
firms. In most cases the rationale of the integration is evidently the increase of 
the market power of the firms involved rather than a reduction in cost. 
!d. See also William S. Comanor, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions: White Motor 
and Its Aftermath, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1419, 1436 (1968) (arguing that contractual integration 
cannot produce efficiencies). 
Indeed, the United States relied upon this sort of reasoning in Schwinn. Responding 
to Schwinn's assertion that condemnation of its restraints would lead it to integrate forward 
into distribution, the government claimed that such integration should be treated more 
leniently than contractual restraints, as only the former could produce demonstrable effi-
ciencies. 
[A] rule that treats manufacturers who assume the distribution function them-
selves more leniently than those who impose restraints on independent distribu-
tors merely reflects the fact that, although integration in distribution may 
sometimes benefit the economy by leading to cost savings, agreements to maintain 
resale prices or to impose territorial restrictions of unlimited duration or outlet 
limitations of the type involved here have never been shown to produce compara-
ble economies. 
Brief for the United States at 50, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 
(1967) (No. 25). 
25 Professor Coase offered the following summary of the attitude of economists during 
this period: 
One important result of this preoccupation with the monopoly problem is that 
if an economist finds something-a business practice of one sort or other-that 
he does not understand, he looks for a monopoly explanation. And as we are 
very ignorant in this field, the number of ununderstandable practices tends to 
be rather large, and the reliance on a monopoly explanation is frequent. 
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solicitude for trader freedom and price theory-formed a powerful com-
bination that justified an unprecedented expansion of the Sherman Act. 26 
Horizontal restraints-even those ancillary to legitimate joint ven-
tures-did not escape this hegemony. Indeed, one of the most telling 
exemplars of Populist era jurisprudence involved just such a restraint. 27 
In United States v. Topco the United States challenged territorial restraints 
adopted by a cooperative purchasing association made up of twenty-five 
regional supermarket chains. The Topco Association essentially served 
as a purchasing agent for its members, buying and distributing to these 
chains hundreds of grocery products under various brand names Topco 
owned.28 Certain restraints accompanied the formation of the coopera-
tive. In particular, the Association's bylaws awarded licenses to member 
chains providing the exclusive right to market Topco-brand products in 
their home territory. 29 
The district court found that Topco's members possessed no market 
power and that the restraints were necessary to create a private label 
system similar to that employed by larger chains.30 Indeed, the district 
court expressly found that the restraints would combat free riding, 
encourage promotion of Topco brands, and enhance competition 
between member chains and larger national chains.31 Without question-
Coase, supra note 23, at 67. Classic applications of this approach in the antitrust context 
include Coman or, supra note 24, and Donald F. Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements 
UndcrtheAntitrustLaws, 72 HARV. L. REv. 50 (1958). 
26 See Donald I. Baker & William Blumenthal, Ideological Cycles and Unstable Antitrust Rules, 
31 ANTITRUST BuLL. 323, 330 (1986) (arguing that during this period, "(t)he precise 
objective of antitrust policy was unimportant, for populist and economic approaches 
yielded consistent results"). Other scholars have been less charitable, asserting that the 
Court used economic theory as a fig leaf, to justifY predetermined results. See Kauper, 
supra note 21, at 330 (arguing that the Warren Court "used economic doctrine to support 
decisions arrived at upon other grounds"); Frederick M. Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and 
the Delusion of Models: The Faustian Pact of Law and Economics, 72 CEO. LJ. 1511, 1524-27 
(1984) (arguing that the Warren Court employed economic models to justifY decisions 
motivated by political and social concerns). 
27 United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). 
28 !d. at 598. 
29 !d. at 601-03. 
30 In particular, the district court found that the market shares of Topco's various 
members ranged from 1.5% to 16% in their respective market areas, with an average share 
of 5.87%. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 319 F. Supp. 1031, 1033 (N.D. Ill. 1970), 
rev'd, 405 U.S. 596 (1972). 
3! According to the court: 
It is clear from the record that Topco members believe having an exclusivity 
comparable to that enjoyed by the national chains is an indispensable element 
of Topco's effectiveness and their interest in membership. Top officers of a 
number of members testified unequivocally that they would not spend the money, 
time and energy necessary to establish consumer acceptance of Topco brands 
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ing these findings, the Supreme Court declared the restraints per se 
unlawful. The Court was not troubled by the absence of consumer injury: 
it was enough for the majority that the voluntary contractual restraints 
purportedly limited the "freedom" of each member of the Association 
to choose where and how it would sell Topco-brand products.32 Moreover 
in their areas of operation if any of their substantial competitors could likewise 
sell the same brand names and would not continue as members of Topco but 
would, to the extent possible, endeavor to develop their own private label pro-
grams in which they would have exclusivity. 
Topco, 319 F. Supp. at 1040. 
Moreover: 
All of the witnesses for the defendant testified that the cost of developing con-
sumer acceptance for the Topco private brands was born by each member in its 
own territory. Every executive of a Topco member who was a witness stated 
categorically that his chain would not be interested in devoting the time, energy 
and money to the necessary promotion and would not be interested in Topco 
membership if one or more of his chain's competitors in the area also offered 
consumers the same brands and products. All of the defendant's witnesses asserted 
that monopoly of Topco private label products was as essential to Topco members 
as the monopoly of A & P, National Tea, Jewel and other national chains' private 
label products was to these chains. 
!d. at 1042. 
The court relied on this testimony in holding that 
[w]hatever anti-competitive effect these practices may have on competition in 
the sale of Topco private label brands is far outweighed by the increased ability of 
Topco members to compete both with the national chains and other supermarkets 
operating in their respective territories .... Expressed another way, the relief 
which the government here seeks would not increase competition in Topco 
private label brands but would substantially diminish competition in the super-
market field. The antitrust laws are certainly not intended to accomplish such a 
result. Only the national chains and the other supermarkets who compete with 
Topco members would be benefitted. The consuming public obviously would 
not. 
!d. at 1043. 
~2 The Court's extraordinary statement is worth quoting in full: 
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta 
of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom 
and our free enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our 
fundamental political freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and every 
business, no matter how small, is the freedom to compete-to assert with vigor, 
imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can muster. 
Implicit in such freedom is the notion that it cannot be foreclosed with respect 
to one sector of the economy because certain private citizens or groups believe 
that such foreclosure might promote greater competition in a more important 
sector of the economy. Cf United States v. Philadelphia Nat'! Bank, 374 U.S. 
321, 371 (1963). 
The District Court determined that by limiting the freedom of its individual 
members to compete with each other, Topco was doing a greater good by fostering 
competition between members and large supermarket chains. But, the fallacy in 
this is that Topco has no authority under the Sherman Act to determine the 
respective values of competition in various sectors of the economy. On the 
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the Court all but ignored the potential benefits of the restraints, taking 
refuge in its assertion that courts were incapable of determining whether, 
in fact, the benefits of the restraints outweighed any anticompetitive 
harms.33 Indeed, the Court showed no sign that it understood the poten-
tial benefits of the restraints, or the market failure that its ruling 
would engender. 
The one-two punch of trader freedom and price theory did not confine 
itself to Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Similar attitudes drove the Court's 
approach to mergers under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. In United States 
v. Von's Grocery, for instance, the Court voided a merger between two 
medium-sized grocery chains in a remarkably unconcentrated market 
with no discernable barriers to entry.34 The Court made no attempt to 
argue that the transaction would harm consumers, instead finding anti-
trust harm in the elimination of independent competitors. 35 Absent 
an extraordinary justification, the Court suggested, mergers between 
competitors offended the Act whenever there was a trend toward more 
concentration, defined as a reduction in the number of firms operating 
in the market in question. 36 The Court did not consider the possibility-
suggested by the absence of actual market concentration-that the trans-
action produced pro-consumer efficiencies. 37 This failure was not surpris-
contrary, the Sherman Act gives to each Topco member and to each prospective 
member the right to ascertain for itself whether or not competition with other 
supermarket chains is more desirable than competition in the sale of Topco-
brand products. 
Topco, 405 U.S. at 610-11. 
55 See id., 405 U.S. at 611-12. Of course, the purported inability to balance benefits 
against harms might just as easily have militated in favor of per se legality, given the 
absence of market power. See Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 
F.2d 210, 229 n.ll (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork,J.). 
34 See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966). The merger in Von's 
Grocery created a firm with a 7.5% share of the Los Angeles grocery market; the twelve 
largest firms accounted for only 49% of the market, which included over 3500 independent 
grocery stores. See id. at 272-74, 281 (White,]. concurring). Moreover, barriers to entry 
were non-existent; in the 1960s, for instance, 128 firms had entered the market de novo. 
/d. at 292 n.19 (Stewart,]. dissenting). 
55 See id. at 274-76 (quoting United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 
323 (1897)) (dicta)). Compare Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. at 300 (Stewart,]. dissenting) ("Three 
thousand five hundred and ninety single-store firms is a lot of grocery stores."). 
56 See Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. at 277 ("This merger cannot be defended on the ground 
that one of the companies was about to fail or that the two had to merge to save themselves 
from destruction by some larger and more powerful competitor."); id. at 273 n.3 (criticizing 
district court for "us[ing) the term 'concentration' in some sense other than a total 
decrease in the number of separate competitors which is the crucial point here."). 
57 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 205-06 (1978) (explaining that merg-
ers in unconcentrated markets likely produce efficiencies). 
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ing-just five years earlier, in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, the Court 
had agreed with the United States that the presence of efficiencies 
militated against a transaction. 38 
II. THE COLLAPSE OF POPULISM 
The premises supporting the Court's hostile stance toward contractual 
restraints and mergers soon came under heavy attack. First of all, econo-
mists and others began the work of overthrowing the price-theoretic 
paradigm. In particular, these scholars questioned price theory's habit 
of assuming away opportunism and the information and bargaining costs 
that made such behavior possible.39 This assumption, of course, went 
hand in hand with price theory's assertion that efficiencies were techno-
38 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) ("[W]e cannot fail to 
recognize Congress' desire to promote competition through the protection of viable, 
small, locally owned business[es]. Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and 
prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets."); see 
also Timothy]. Muris, The lc.Jficiency Defrmse Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 CASE W. 
REs. L. RJ.:v. 381, 405-06 (1980) (showing that government argued that lower costs and 
higher quality militated against the merger). 
39 These assumptions were reflected in assertions by economists that dealers would make 
optimal marketing and purchasing decisions ''voluntarily," that is, without contractual 
restraint. See Comanor, supra note 24, at 1430 (asserting that "unrestricted market" would 
provide optimal pre- and post-sale dealer services, despite free-rider problem); id. at 1433 
(same);joEL B. DIRLAM & ALFRED E. KAHN, FAIR CoMPETITION: THE LAW AND EcoNOMICS 
OF ANTITRUST Poucv 181-87 (1954) ("It is difficult to see why many of the mutual 
benefits and socially beneficial consequences of exclusive dealing require coercion [i.e., 
contractual requirement] for their achievement."). 
[I)f a strong and legitimate business need for exclusive selling actually does exist, 
it is strange that dealers will not follow this policy without being compelled to 
do so by contract, for the advantages that result should benefit them as well as 
the firms from which they buy. Perhaps an occasional dealer will be too inept 
or shortsighted to perceive his best interests, but such men could presumably 
be replaced for demonstrable inefficiency without resorting to a widespread use 
of restrictive contracts. 
Derek C. Bok, The Tampa Electric Case and the Problem of Exclusive Arrangemrmts Under the 
Clayton Act, 1961 SuP. CT. REv. 267, 307-08. The United States, it should be noted, shared 
this view. In FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., the Solicitor General, head of the Antitrust Division, 
and FTC urged the Court to void exclusive dealing contracts because: 
[E)ven if it were supposed that complete line concentration was the most efficient 
approach, one would expect that retailers would be eager to achieve the attendant 
economies and would not have to be held to the line by contractual agreement. 
As the Commission concluded, "[w]hile line concentration itself may or may not 
be economically justifiable, there is no economic justification for making the 
adherence to this doctrine the subject of agreement between buyer and seller 
and enforcing the agreement to the latter's advantage" (citation omitted). Inde-
pendent shoe dealers do not need restrictions on their freedom of choice in 
order to achieve efficiency. 
Brief for the United States at 29-30, FTCv. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966) (No. 118). 
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logical in origin and could only be realized within a firm. 40 In the real 
world, these scholars said, information and bargaining costs were in fact 
significant, and their existence suggested that the interests of buyer and 
seller might not always be aligned, particularly after the passage of title. 41 
Thus, reliance on market contracting to conduct economic activity often 
entails a cost, what these economists called a "transaction cost. "42 These 
insights, in turn, suggested benign explanations for conduct previously 
deemed monopolistic. For instance, while price theory had viewed exclu-
sive territories as attempts to induce "too much" advertising so as to 
differentiate a manufacturer's product and enhance its market power, 
the new economics saw many such restraints as attempts to reduce the 
cost of transacting, that is, the cost of relying on the market to distribute 
products, by preventing opportunistic shirking by dealers.43 Similar 
insights suggested benign explanations for tying contracts, minimum 
resale price maintenance, and maximum horizontal and vertical price 
fixing. 44 
Further, some assaults came from within the price-theoretic paradigm. 
In particular, economists questioned the assertion by some scholars that 
the positive correlation between concentration and profits was due to 
market power instead of efficiencies associated with large scale produc-
tion.45 At the same time, Oliver Williamson demonstrated that even a 
merger to monopoly could produce a net increase in wealth so long as 
40 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. 
41 See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and 
Market Division, 75 YALE LJ. 373, 435-36 (1966) (identifying free-rider problem); id. at 
468 ("It would be extraordinarily costly for the manufacturer to learn at first hand the 
real sales potential of every dealer's area and just how and where each dealer's sales effort 
should be expended."); Oliver Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market 
Failure Considerations, 61 AM. EcoN. REv. 112 (1971); Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufac-
turers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 86 (1960). See generally Meese, Price Theory, supra 
note 23, at 167-68. 
42 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 23, at 15-35; Meese, Price Theory, supra note 23, at 167-68; 
Bork, supra note 41, at 435-36 (arguing that, because of the free-rider problem, a "group 
becomes a less efficient marketer than a single fully-integrated firm of the same size"). 
43 See Bork, supra note 41, at 429-52. Compare Comanor, supra note 24, at 1429-30. 
44 See, e.g., Alan J. Meese, Tying Meets the New Institutional Economics: Farewell to the Chimera 
of Forcing, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 59-84 (1997) [hereinafter Meese, Tying] (describing 
various ways that tying can reduce transaction costs); Benjamin Klein & Lester F. Saft, The 
Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts, 28 J.L. & EcoN. 345 (1985); Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. CHI. L. Rev. 886 (1981); Bork, supra note 41, at 
453-64; Telser, supra note 41, at 89-96; see also Meese, Price Theory, supra note 23, at 159-70 
(showing that procompetitive explanations for vertical restraints depend upon a rejection 
of various price-theoretic assumptions). 
45 See HovENKAMP, supra note 17, at 44-45; Harold Demsetz, Industry Structure, Market 
Rivalry, and Public Policy, 16J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1971). 
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the transaction produced a slight reduction in average costs.46 Bigger, 
it seemed, was sometimes betterY 
Taken together, these various developments in economic theory con-
firmed what many had expected all along, namely, that protection of 
"trader freedom" and atomistic competition came at a price, a price paid 
by consumers and society as a whole.48 At the same time, legal scholars 
began to question whether, in fact, the antitrust statutes empowered 
judges to develop antitrust doctrine by balancing the interests of dealers 
and other producers against those of consumers.49 According to these 
scholars, consumers-not producers-were the intended beneficiaries 
of antitrust policy.5° Firms that wanted protection from competition 
should seek assistance from Congress, not the courts. 
In a "shot heard 'round the (antitrust) world," the Court reversed 
course in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. 51 There the Court 
46 See Oliver Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Trade-Offt, 58 AM. 
EcoN. REv. 18 (1968). 
47 Some members of the "Chicago School" of antitrust have argued that recent advances 
in antitrust economics are generally the result of ''viewing antitrust policy through the 
lens of price theory." See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. 
PA. L. REv. 925, 928 (1979). However, most insights associated with the Chicago School 
in fact result from application of the so-called New Institutional Economics, a self-described 
competitor of the price-theoretic paradigm. See Meese, Price Theory, supra note 23, at 
159-70. Moreover, in some instances, overreliance on price theory has caused Chicagoans 
to give incomplete accounts of the causes and consequences of certain agreements. See 
Meese, Tying, supra note 44, at 44-49 (contending that Chicago School approach to tying 
contracts has undervalued existence and relevance of procompetitive benefits of such 
agreements). Certainly, unadorned price theory can be a useful tool when analyzing some 
transactions. Where contractual integration is concerned, however, it is generally not up 
to the task. 
48 See, e.g., Kauper, supra note 21, at 330-34 (arguing that the Court should openly 
balance trader freedom and consumer welfare, and that failure to do so in previous 
decisions was disingenuous). 
49 See 1 PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw~ 111 (1997); BORK, 
supra note 37, at 82-89; Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 
9 J.L. & EcoN. 7 (1966); see also Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary 
Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS LJ. 65 ( 1982). 
50 It should not be that these scholars did not always agree about just how to define 
"consumer welfare." Some equated "consumers" with society as a whole, while others 
equated "consumers" with "purchasers." Compare BoRK, supra note 37, at 107-15 (equating 
consumer welfare with total social welfare); Robert H. Lande, The Rise and (Coming) Fall 
of Efficiency as the Ruler of Antitrust, 33 ANTITRUST BuLL. 429 (1988) (equating consumer 
welfare with welfare of purchasers only); Lande, supra note 49 (same). Nevertheless, these 
scholars agreed that values, such as "trader freedom" and decentralization of power, have 
no independent role to play in the development of antitrust doctrine. See, e.g., 1 AREEDA 
& HOVENKAMP, supra note 49, ~ 111; Lande, supra note 49, at 104-05. see also Meese, Liberty 
and Antitrust, supra note 20, at 36--67 (showing that formative era courts repeatedly rejected 
assertions that Sherman Act was designed to further trader freedom in the form of liberty 
from contract). 
51 433 u.s. 36 (1977). 
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reconsidered and overruled its holding in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn 
& Co.,52 that contractual restraints on a dealer's disposition of a product 
after passage of title were per se unlawful. In so doing, the Court repudi-
ated the two central tenets of the Populist era. First, the Court rejected 
"trader freedom" as a value of independent significance under the Sher-
man Act.53 Second, the Court fully embraced then-recent advances in 
economic theory suggesting that vertical distribution restraints could 
prevent "free riding" and thus serve the interest of consumers.54 It did 
not matter when or how title passed, the Court said; all vertical 
restraints-save those on price-should be analyzed under a full-blown 
rule of reason.ss 
The influence of new economic theory on antitrust doctrine was not 
limited to the context of vertical restraints. Shortly after Sylvania, in 
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (BMI), the Court 
examined what seemed to be a price-fixing agreement-a so-called "blan-
ket license" created by two clearinghouses that acted as sales agents for 
thousands of horizontal competitors.56 Each clearinghouse, which had 
purchased the non-exclusive rights to perform a million or more copy-
righted works, offered radio stations and others the right to license its 
entire library of works for a fee based upon the purchaser's revenue.s' 
Noting that each arrangement fixed prices in a literal sense, as the 
ultimate owners of the compositions had no power over the price of the 
blanket license, the Court nevertheless found that the arrangement 
"accompanie[d] the integration of sales, monitoring, and enforcement 
against unauthorized copyright use" and reduced the costs that would 
be associated with reliance upon individual market transactions. 58 Thus, 
the Justices concluded, the arrangement should be analyzed under the 
rule of reason.sg 
52 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled l7y Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 
36 (1977). 
53 To be precise, the Court rejected the assertion by Judge Browning, dissenting below, 
that the Sherman Act was designed to prohibit restrictions on dealer autonomy without 
regard to the impact of those restrictions on consumers. See GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continen-
tal T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 1019 (9th Cir. 1976) (Browning,]. dissenting), affd, 433 U.S. 
36 (1977). According to the Court: "Competitive economies have social and political as 
well as economic advantages, but an antitrust policy divorced from market considerations 
would lack any objective benchmarks. As Mr. Justice Brandeis reminded us: 'Every agree-
ment concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of 
their very essence."' Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 53 n.21 (citation omitted). 
54 See id. at 54-56. 
55 See id. at 56-59. 
56 See 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
57 See id. at 4-6. 
58 See id. at 20-22; see also HovENKAMP, supra note 17, at 210 ("The blanket license 
arrangement saved untold millions of dollars in transaction costs."). 
59 See BMI, 441 U.S. at 19-25. 
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To some, Sylvania and BMI signaled the full retreat of the Populist 
approach and the advent of a new era in which the Court would employ 
the latest economic theories in a single-minded pursuit of consumer 
welfare when applying the antitrust laws.60 The actual record, however, 
has been more nuanced. To be sure, the Court has abandoned or nar-
rowed various substantive prohibitions along the lines suggested by 
recent advances in economic theory. 61 Moreover, the Court has reformu-
lated summary judgment standards so as to favor the interests of consum-
ers over dealers and other producers.62 Finally, the Court has narrowed 
the class of parties entitled to seek damages for anticompetitive conduct, 
holding, for instance, that a firm does not suffer "antitrust injury" when 
a merger between its competitors produces a more efficient-and thus 
more competitive-firm.63 As a result, the supervision and prosecution 
of mergers has been left largely to the enforcement agencies, who 
embraced the new economic learning and eschewed any effort to pursue 
Populist values at the expense of consumers.64 
On the other hand, the Court stubbornly has clung to some per se 
rules that can only be explained as attempts to further values other than 
consumer welfare. For instance, as noted earlier, the Court has refused 
to repudiate the per se rule against minimum resale price maintenance 
announced early in the last century.65 Moreover, even after Sylvania and 
60 See Easterbrook, supra note 44, at 888 ("The Supreme Court has overruled Schwinn 
and explicitly rejected any analysis that makes antitrust cases turn on the 'autonomy of 
independent businessmen.' Arguments about the effect of a practice on quantity and 
price, not arguments about freedom and autonomy, control antitrust analysis.'') (quoting 
Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 53 n.21)); Robert H. Bork, Vertical Restraints: Schwinn Overruled, 1977 
SuP. CT. REv. 171, 172 ("A great deal of doctrinal baggage about the social purposes of 
these laws ... was silently jettisoned.''); see also Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van 
Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 227-29 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork,J.) (arguing that EM/implicitly 
rejected Topco). 
61 See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997) (holding that maximum resale 
price maintenance should be analyzed under the rule of reason); Brooke Group Ltd. v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 221-27 (1993) (narrowing the definition 
of "competitive injury" under the Robinson-Patman Act); Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp 
Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988) (narrowing definition of minimum resale price mainte-
nance). 
62 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588-98 (1986). 
6
' See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 114-22 (1986); see also Atlantic 
Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 335-40 (1990) (holding that gasoline 
retailer does not suffer antitrust injury if its competitors reduce prices to non-predatory 
levels pursuant to a maximum resale price maintenance agreement). 
64 See U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Merger Guidelines 
(1992, revised 1997), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ~ 13,104 [hereinafter 1992 
Merger Guidelines] ; William Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutrmal Discretion and the 
'Common Law' Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REv. 661 (1982). 
65 See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 400-09 (1911) 
(declaring minimum resale price maintenance unlawful); Business Electronics Carp., 485 
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BMI, the Court reaffirmed the per se ban on horizontal agreements 
setting maximum prices.66 Finally, the Court has reiterated the per se 
rule against tying.67 In so doing, the Court has maintained the Populist 
premise that, without more, "forcing" consumers to purchase a product 
they purportedly do not desire is a cognizable antitrust harm.68 At the 
same time, the Court reiterated the price-theoretic conclusion that tying 
contracts obtained by firms with market power are necessarily the result 
of coercive forcing, ignoring the possibility that such contracts are exam-
ples of purely voluntary integration designed to minimize the costs of 
market transactions.69 
To be sure, these decisions do not explicitly invoke "trader freedom" 
or social concerns over market concentration. As a rhetorical matter, 
consumer welfare generally rules the roost. Still, while these cases "talk 
the talk" of Sylvania, they walk the walk of Von's, Schwinn, and Topco. 70 
U.S. at 724-26 (adhering to Dr. Miles) (dictum); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 
465 U.S. 752, 761 n.7 (1984) (refusing to consider arguments by amicus United States 
that Dr. Miles should be overruled); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 
36, 51 n.l8 (1977) (suggesting that Court would adhere to Dr. Miles). 
66 See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 348 (1982); see also Peter 
M. Gerhart, The Supreme Courl and Antitrust Analysis: The (Near) Triumph of the Chicago Schoo~ 
1982 SuP. CT. REv. 319, 344-48 (concluding that the Maricopa County decision rested 
upon a rejection of consumer welfare as the sole normative value in antitrust); Louis 
Kaplow, Antitrust, Law & Economics, and the Courls, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 
1987, at 181, 205 (same). 
67 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs. Inc., 504 U.S. 451,461-62 (1992); 
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9-10 (1984). 
68 See jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 12-15; see also Meese, Tying, supra note 44, at 7, 15-16. 
69 See jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 15-18; Kodak, 504 U.S. at 461-62, 464-65; see also Meese, 
Tying, supra note 44, at 20, 66-67. 
70 See Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1364 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J.) (opining 
that Court's continuing hostility toward minimum resale price maintenance must rest 
upon something other than concern for consumer welfare), vacated, 522 U.S. 3 ( 1997); 
Alan]. Meese, Economic Theory, Trader Freedom, and Consumer Welfare: State Oil v. Khan and 
the Continuing Incoherence of Antitrust Doctrine, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 763, 771-72 (1999) 
[hereinafter Meese, Economic Theory]. The Court has consistently invoked stare decisis to 
justifY adherence to these outmoded rules. See, e.g., jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 9 ("It is far 
too late in the history of our antitrust jurisprudence to question the proposition that 
certain tying arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of stifling competition and therefore 
are unreasonable 'per se. "'). However, because the Sherman Act creates a common law of 
trade restraints, respect for precedent does not require adherence to doctrines based 
upon factual premises that have been proven false in light of changes in economic theory. 
See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20-21 (1997) ("[T]he general presumption that 
legislative changes should be left to Congress has less force with respect to the Sherman 
Act in light of the accepted view that Congress 'expected the courts to give shape to the 
statute's broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition."') (quoting National Soc'y 
of Prof! Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978)); Business Electronics Cmp., 485 
U.S. at 723-31; id. at 732 ("The Sherman Act adopted the term 'restraint of trade' along 
with its dynamic potential. It invokes the common law itself and not merely the static 
content that the common law had assigned to the term in 1890. "). Indeed, even before 
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III. PRICE THEORY REDUX: THE QUICK LOOK 
NCAA and the "quick look" doctrine it spawned cannot be squared 
with the modern-and sounder-approach to antitrust exemplified by 
Sylvania and BMI. Instead, the quick look doctrine is plainly a throwback 
to Topco and the pre-Sylvania days of Populism and price theory. Although 
the NCAA Court abjured per se treatment for the agreement before it, 
the Justices endorsed Topco as the general rule, carving out an exception 
only for those cases in which some horizontal restraint of competition 
is necessary to create the product in question. 71 Moreover, when analyzing 
the arrangement's "anticompetitive" effects as part of its truncated rule 
of reason analysis, the Court echoed a concern expressed in Topco, by 
stating that "[i]ndividual competitors lose their freedom to compete."72 
Finally, in an approach more reminiscent of Von's Grocery than Sylvania, 
the Sherman Act was passed, courts regularly adjusted the doctrine of trade restraints to 
reflect changes in economic theory or conditions. See, e.g., Skrainka v. Scharringhausen, 
8 Mo. App. 522, 525 (1880) ("It is not that contracts in restraint of trade are any more 
legal or enforceable now than they were at any former period, but that the courts look 
differently at the question as to what is a restraint of trade."); Diamond Match Co. v. 
Roeber, 13 N.E. 419, 421-22 (N.Y. 1887) (endorsing modification of the common law of 
trade restraints in light of changed economic conditions); see also Meese, Liberty and 
Antitrust, supra note 20, at 66-67 (arguing that Court relied upon changed perceptions 
of the effects of cartel agreements in sustaining Sherman Act's interference with liberty 
of contract). Where changes in economic theory undermine the premises of former 
decisions, the Court should adjust the doctrine in light of such developments. See Meese, 
Tying, supra note 44, at 86-99 (arguing that the Court should abandon the per se rule 
against tying in light of recent developments suggesting that ties can be the result of 
voluntary integration); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEx. L. REv. 1165, 
1247-50 (1993)). 
It has been suggested that Congress has signaled its support for the per se rule against 
minimum resale price maintenance by repealing the Miller-Tydings Act, which allowed 
states to immunize minimum resale price agreements via so-called fair trade laws. See 
Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (amending 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1, 45(a)); Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51 n.l8 (opining that repeal of Miller-Tydings 
Act signaled support for ban on minimum resale price maintenance). This argument fails 
for two independent reasons, however. First, the Miller-Tydings Act allowed states to 
immunize any and all minimum resale price maintenance agreements, even those that 
were simply disguised dealer cartels. Repeal of this statute, then, does not signal disapproval 
of resale price maintenance that would pass muster under the rule of reason. Second, 
repeal of an exception to the Sherman Act eighty years after its passage tells us literally 
nothing about the original meaning of the statute, which, after all, is the ultimate focus 
of the inquiry. See West Va. Univ. Hasps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 101 (1991) ("The 
'will of Congress' we look to is not a will evolving from Session to Session, but a will 
expressed and fixed in a particular enactment."). 
71 See NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85,99 & n.18 (1984) (citing 
Topco with approval for proposition that "an agreement among competitors on the way 
in which they will compete with one another .... has often been held to be unreasonable 
as a matter of law"); id. at 99 & n.19 (relying on Topco and other decisions in asserting 
that "the challenged practices create a limitation on output; our cases have held that such 
limitations are unreasonable restraints of trade"). 
72 See id. at 106-07. 
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the Court shifted the burden of justification to the defendants, without 
meaningful proof of anticompetitive effects, let alone proof of market 
power.73 
NCAA is to be applauded to the extent that it created an "escape hatch," 
allowing defendants to justify some restraints that would otherwise be 
per se unlawful.'4 Moreover, the Department of Justice deserves credit 
for suggesting that restraints such as those at issue in Topco should also 
receive a quick look, instead of the sort of per se condemnation appar-
ently endorsed by NCAA. 75 But, this simply begs the central question: 
why subject either restraint to a quick look, instead of the sort of full-
blown rule of reason treatment usually accorded ancillary restraints, for 
instance? The mere fact that a restraint limits the "freedom" of the parties 
to it cannot itself constitute cognizable antitrust harm; enforcement 
of voluntary agreements enhances freedom. 76 Moreover, advances in 
73 See id. at llO-ll; see also Massachusetts Bd. of Registration in Optometry, llO F.T.C. 
549, 604 (1988) (requiring proof by defendant that efficiency justification "is valid"). As 
noted below, the Department of Justice would impose on proponents of the restraint a 
burden of production, not a burden of proof. See infra note 75. 
74 See Kattan, supra note 18, at 623-24; Klein, supra note 18, at 4 (stepwise approach 
"should open the door to at least some additional consideration of procompetitive justifica-
tions for horizontal agreements."). Of course, very few agreements actually escape through 
this hatch, at least if the outcomes of reported decisions are any guide. 
75 See Klein, supra note 18, at 4 (stating that the Department of Justice would most likely 
subject Topco-like restraints to a "quick look" instead of per se condemnation). It should 
also be noted that the Division has indicated that proponents of a restraint do not bear 
a burden of proving that a restraint actually produces the benefits claimed for it, but 
instead need only produce significant concrete evidence of such benefits. Compare Califor-
nia Dental Ass'n v. ITC, 526 U.S. 756, 788 (1999) (Breyer,]., concurring in part, dissenting 
in part) (stating (incorrectly) that "[i]n the usual Sherman Act§ 1 case, the defendant 
bears the burden of establishing a procompetitivejustification") (emphasis added)); NCAA, 
468 U.S. at 113 (proponents of restraint bear "a heavy burden of establishing an affirmative 
defense which competitively justifies [the restraint]"). Thus, the Division deserves credit 
for adopting an approach that is more consistent with the traditional structure of rule of 
reason analysis. See, e.g., 7 AlmEDA, supra note 12, ~ 1507b, at 397 ("Once the plaintiff 
satisfies his burden of persuasion ... he will prevail unless the defendants introduce 
evidence sufficient to allow the tribunal to find that their conduct promotes a legitimate 
objective.") (emphasis added)); Capital Imaging Assocs., P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. 
Assocs., Inc., 996 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 1993) ("After the plaintiff satisfies its threshold 
burden of proof under the rule of reason, the burden shifts to the defendant to offer 
evidence of the pro-competitive 'redeeming virtues' of their combination. Assuming 
defendant comes forward with such proof, the burden shifts back to plaintiff .... ") 
(citations omitted)). Ironically, Justice Breyer's dissent in California Dental Association cited 
both Professor Areeda and Capital Imaging in support of his assertion that defendants 
bear a burden of proof once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case. Both authori-
ties, however, were quite clearly referring to a burden of production. 
76 Meese, Price Theory, supra note 23, at 188-89; CHARLES fRIED, CONTRACT As PROMISE 
14 (1981) (contending that the enforcement of promises enhances individual autonomy 
by facilitating cooperative efforts); F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 140-41 
(1960) (same). Indeed, courts have long recognized that the protection of freedom of 
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economic theory of the sort recognized in Sylvania have taught that 
horizontal restraints previously deemed anticompetitive are in many 
cases procompetitive attempts to minimize the costs associated with mar-
ket contracting. The restraints in Topco, for instance, were most likely 
attempts to combat market failure, i.e., to reduce the transaction costs 
associated with reliance upon independent market actors to distribute 
the venture's private label products.77 No member of the association 
accounted for more than 16 percent of its respective market; some 
accounted for far less than that. 78 In the modern, post-Sylvania era, there 
is simply no good reason to presume such restraints unlawful without 
proof of anticompetitive effect.79 
It will not do to say, as the Court did in NCAA and Topco, that restraints 
deemed suspect under a quick look regime necessarily reduce competi-
tion between the parties to them, thus presenting special dangers to 
competition.80 Most ancillary restraints are horizontal and reduce compe-
contract is the most effective method of preseiVing competition. See Standard Oil Co. v 
United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911) (Sherman Act depends on belief that "the freedom 
of the individual right to contract, when not unduly or improperly exercised, [is] the 
most efficient means for the prevention of monopoly, since the operation of the centrifugal 
and centripetal forces resulting from the right to freely contract [is] the means by which 
monopoly would be inevitably prevented if no extraneous or sovereign power imposed it 
and no right to make unlawful contracts having a monopolistic tendency were permitted."); 
Whitwell v. Continental Tobacco Co., 125 F. 454, 460-61 (8th Cir. 1903) (Sanborn, J.) 
("Each [defendant] had the right to determine with what persons it would make its 
contracts of sale. There is nothing in the [Sherman Act] which deprived any of these 
competitors of these rights. If there had been, the law itself would have destroyed competi-
tion more effectually than any contracts or combinations of persons or of corporations 
could possibly have stifled it. The exercise of these undoubted rights is essential to the very 
existence of free competition, and so long as their exercise by any person or corporation in 
no way deprives competitors of the same rights, or restricts them in the use of these rights, 
it is difficult to perceive how their exercise can constitute any restriction upon competition 
or any restraint upon interstate trade.") (citations omitted)). 
77 This is exacdy what the district court found, after a full trial. See supra notes 30-31 
and accompanying text.. See also HovENKAMP, supra note 17, at 205-06; Martin B. Louis, 
Restraints Ancillary to joint Ventures and Licensing Agreements: Do Sealy and Topco Logically 
Survive Sylvania and Broadcast Music?, 66 VA. L. REv. 879, 912-13 (1980) (arguing that 
Topco cannot suiVive Sylvania). Cf Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Adas Van Lines, Inc., 
792 F.2d 210, 221-22 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.) (finding that horizontal price restraints 
reduced free riding and passed muster under full-blown rule of reason analysis); Polk 
Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 189-90 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook,].) 
(horizontal agreement allocating product offerings could plausibly prevent free riding 
and thus was analyzed under full-blown rule of reason). 
78 See supra note 30. 
79 See Rnthery Storage, 792 F.2d at 226-29 (concluding that Topco-like restraints should be 
analyzed under full-blown rule of reason). 
80 See NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109-10 (1984). Cf 
Massachusetts Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549, 602-04 (1988). 
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tition by, for instance, dividing territories.81 They nevertheless receive 
full-blown rule of reason treatment.82 The very same is true of horizontal 
mergers which, by definition, eliminate all forms of competition between 
the merging firms. The Topco defendants could have merged completely 
and thus vested control over the private label in a single entity. Such a 
transaction would have eliminated competition between chains far more 
completely and irrevocably than the ancillary restraints at issue. Similarly, 
a merger between all teams in a professional sports league, or a merger 
between two sports leagues, would snuff out competition just as surely 
as would the restraints at issue in NCAA. Yet, neither courts nor the 
enforcement agencies would condemn such mergers without first deter-
mining the level of concentration in a properly defined relevant market.83 
Moreover, the mere existence of such concentration would not be suffi-
cient to establish a prima facie case: courts and the enforcement agencies 
would also consider the possibility that the threat of entry by new firms 
renders current concentration figures illusory.84 Differential treatment 
of ancillary restraints deemed "inherently suspect" under the quick look 
requires some justification.85 
Proponents of the quick look have offered two justifications for hostile 
treatment of the restraints that fall within its ambit. First, they have 
81 See Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255, 266-69 (7th Cir. 1981) (rejecting 
Sherman Act challenge to agreement by seller of assets not to compete with purchaser 
'"in the United States or any foreign country'") (citation omitted); Diamond Match Co. 
v. Roeber, 13 N.E. 419, 423 (N.Y. 1887) (sustaining as reasonable covenant ancillary to 
the sale of a business that excluded defendant from pursuing his trade in the entire 
United States except Nevada and the territory of Montana). See also William J. Kolasky, 
Jr., Counterpoint: The Department of justice's "Stepwise" Approach Imposes Too Heavy a Burden on 
Parties to Horizontal Agreements, ANTITRUST, Spring 1998, at 41, 43 (arguing that presumptive 
invalidity of any horizontal agreement that restricts competition sweeps too broadly and 
would require firms to justify garden variety transactions, such as the formation of a part-
nership). 
82 See Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 189 ("The evaluation of ancillary restraints under the Rule 
of Reason does not imply that ancillary agreements are not real horizontal restraints. They 
are."); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 239-41 (1918) (analyzing 
horizontal restraint ancillary to creation of grain exchange under full-blown rule of reason). 
83 See 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 64, § 1.0; FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 
186 F.3d 1045, 1051-54 (8th Cir. 1999); New York v. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 
321, 361-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
84 See United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 984-85 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Thomas, 
J.); United States v. Waste Management, Inc., 743 F.2d 976, 982-83 (2d Cir. 1984) (Winter, 
J.); 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 64, § 3.0. 
85 See BMI, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979) ("When two partners set the price of 
their goods or services they are literally 'price fixing,' but they are not per se in violation 
of the Sherman Act."); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360-61 
(1933) ("The mere fact that the parties to an agreement eliminate competition between 
themselves is not enough to condemn it .... The familiar illustrations of partnerships, 
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invoked ·~udicial experience," claiming that such experience indicates 
that these agreements usually produce net competitive harm.86 Second, 
they have asserted that proof of market share and other indicia of 
anticompetitive effect is often difficult to come by.87 Thus, it is said, a 
requirement that plaintiffs actually prove anticompetitive effects will 
result in an unacceptable number of "false negatives," that is, refusals 
to condemn restraints that are, in fact, anticompetitive.88 As shown below, 
neither of these justifications withstands scrutiny, thus suggesting some 
other explanation for the differential treatment of mergers and other 
horizontal restraints. 
It is certainly true that courts have had significant exposure to horizon-
tal restraints that at least arguably serve some beneficial purpose. Indeed, 
the Supreme Court invoked this experience in Topco when it held that 
the restraints in question were per se unlawful.89 Yet, such exposure does 
not constitute "experience" of the sort that can support condemnation 
of these restraints as "inherently suspect." To begin with, there is no 
reason to assume that the horizontal restraints that the Court has ana-
lyzed in the past are representative of the whole host of restraints that 
are subject to the quick look doctrine.90 Are most such restraints like 
the ones in Topco---procompetitive efforts to combat market failure-or 
the ones in NCAA-restraints that may have been an attempt to suppress 
output? Are most proponents of "direct restrictions on price or output" 
entities like the NBA, or instead the Patriot League, which could not 
possibly harm competition in any conceivable market for athletes or 
athletic competition.91 No one really knows. 
and e~terprises fairly integrated in the interest of the promotion of commerce, at once 
occur. ) . 
86 See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972). 
87 See Tom & Pak, supra note 17, at 399; Stephen Calkins, California Dental Association: 
Not a Quick Look But Not the Full Monty, 67 ANTITRUST LJ. 495, 521 (2000). 
88 See Tom & Pak, supra note 17, at 398-99; Calkins, supra note 87, at 521; see also Klein, 
supra note 18, at 5 (requirement that parties offer proof of procompetitive benefits first 
"lessen[s] the burden of proving a violation compared to what we'd have to show under 
a full-blown rule of reason analysis"). 
89 Tapco, 405 U.S. at 607-08 ("It is only after considerable experience with certain business 
relationships that courts classify them as per se violations of the Sherman Act."). 
9° Cf Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 
185 SCIENCE 1124, 1124-31 (1974) (DESCRIBING VARIOUS COGNITIVE BIASES, INCLUDING 
TENDENCY OF HUMANS TO ASSUME THAT ANY GIVEN SAMPLE IS REPRESENTATIVE OF 
LARGER POPULATION). 
91 See Chicago Prof! Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National Basketball Ass'n, 95 F.3d 593 
(7th Cir. 1996) (analyzing NBA's attempt to limit number of games broadcast by non-
network superstation). The Patriot League is an intercollegiate athletic association formed 
by Army, Bucknell, Colgate, Holy Cross, Lafayette, Lehigh, and Navy. The league prohibits 
members from awarding athletic scholarships, with the exception of basketball scholar-
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At any rate, even if the sample of cases that has reached the Court is 
representative, there is still no basis for concluding that restraints deemed 
suspect under the quick look approach are any more pernicious than, 
say, a horizontal merger or covenant not to compete. To the contrary, 
most of this experience has consisted simply of condemning such 
restraints without any analysis whatsoever. In Topco, for instance, the 
Court refused to examine the proffered benefits of the restraint, benefits 
the district court identified after a full triaJ.92 Such summary condemna-
tion followed naturally during the Populist era, when trader freedom 
mattered and the inhospitality tradition held sway among economists 
and antitrust lawyers. In this environment, there was no reason to require 
proof of anticompetitive effect, or to allow defendants to explain their 
conduct, as there was only one possible explanation for such agree-
ments.93 Here the law of tying provides a useful analogy. For decades 
the Court held that "tying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond 
the suppression of competition. "94 This assertion, of course, rested upon 
outmoded assumptions, derived from the price-theoretic paradigm.95 
Presumably a court or enforcement agency considering the legality of 
tying de novo would find this "experience" to be of little assistance. In 
the same way, the experience of Populist courts applying an outmoded 
economic paradigm is simply useless to a modern appraisal of horizontal 
restraints deemed "inherently suspect" under the quick look.96 
As noted above, some have also argued that a requirement that plain-
tiffs actually prove anticompetitive effects will prove unduly burdensome, 
with the result that anticompetitive restraints will escape detection and 
ships. See Mark Asher & Seth Emerson, American to Leave CAA for the Patriot League, WASH. 
PosT, Apr. 25, 2000, at D-I; see also About the Patriot League <http://www.patriotleague 
.org/aboutpl.htm> (stating that member schools award "predominantly need-based schol-
arships"). This direct restriction on price competition between schools for student athletes 
would be deemed "inherently suspect" under a quick look approach. 
92 See also United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (I967) (declaring territorial allocation 
per se unlawful despite trial court's determination that such restraints were ancillary to 
larger venture and not unreasonable). 
93 Cf Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 593-98 (1986) 
(courts should be skeptical of offers to prove conspiracies that make no economic sense.). 
94 Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 498 (1969) (quoting 
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. I, 6 (1958) (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. 
United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305 (1949))). See also jefferson Parish Hasp. Dist. No.2 v. 
Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9 (I984) ("certain tying arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of 
stifling competition"). 
95 Meese, Tying, supra note 44, at 66-94 (demonstrating that ties obtained by firms with 
market power can in fact be instances of voluntary integration, contrary to assumption 
of Jefferson Parish). 
96 See THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS II4-I7 (2d ed. I970) 
(explaining that paradigm shifts cause reinterpretation of previously observed phe-
nomena). 
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punishment.9' This of course was not the case in NCAA, the decision 
that spawned the quick look, where the Court found that the defendants 
possessed market power.98 This assertion does not survive scrutiny, how-
ever. Here again, the merger analogy proves helpful. Both government 
enforcement guidelines and judicial precedent require plaintiffs to make 
out a prima facie case of anticompetitive effects before shifting any 
burden of justification to the proponents of the transaction.99 Moreover, 
plaintiffs-be they government or private-routinely make such show-
ings by demonstrating that the transaction in question creates high 
levels of concentration in a market characterized by barriers to entry. 100 
Proponents of the quick look approach have adduced no evidence that 
merger litigation is beset by false negatives; nor have they explained 
why proof of market structure would be more difficult in the rule of 
reason con text. 101 
To be sure, litigation over the scope of a relevant market consumes 
resources, and courts sometimes define markets too broadly-or too 
narrowly. Nevertheless, litigation over the virtues of a restraint is also 
expensive. 102 Moreover, courts and enforcement agencies have not always 
97 See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text. 
98 See NCAA v. Board of Regents ofUniv. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 111-12 (1984). Similarly, 
in FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986), which some have read as an 
application of the quick look, the Court invoked the Commission's "finding of actual, 
sustained adverse effects on competition," as well as the fact that members of the Association 
were "heavy majorities" of practicing dentists in the relevant areas. See id. at 460-61. 
99 See 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 64, §§ 1-3; FTC v. University Health, Inc., 
938 F.2d 1206, 1218 (11th Cir. 1991). 
100 See, e.g., Olin Corp. v. FTC, 986 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1993); University Health, 938 F.2d 
at 1219-20; United States v. Rockford Mem'l Corp., 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, 
].); Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, amended on other grounds, 
890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989); R.C. Bigelow, Inc. v. Unilever N.V., 867 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 
1989); Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner,].); FTC v. 
PPG Indus., Inc., 798 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork,J.); FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 
12 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 1998); FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997); 
Community Publishers, Inc. v. Donrey Corp., 892 F. Supp. 1146 (W.D. Ark. 1995), affd 
sub nom. Community Publishers, Inc. v. DR Partners, 139 F.3d 1180 (8th Cir. 1998). 
101 See Kattan, supra note 18, at 624 (contending that the quick look "became a license 
to avoid the heavy lifting of analyzing markets and evaluating competitive effects (exercises 
that the Commission and its staff perform routinely in the merger area)"). Some have 
relied upon evidence that defendants almost always prevail when courts employ a full-
blown rule of reason to support the claim that such litigation can produce false negatives. 
See, e.g., Calkins, supra note 87, at 521. Such evidence is equally consistent with a competing 
hypothesis, namely, that per se rules and the quick look are over-inclusive, leaving only 
contracts that are almost always procompetitive for full-blown rule of reason review. At 
any rate, the vast majority of contracts are beneficial or harmless; one would therefore 
expect that most would pass muster under the rule of reason. 
102 See Klein, supra note 18, at 7 (stating that, under quick look approach, the Division 
will require proponents of a restraint to come forward with "real-world evidence-factual 
evidence, expert economic evidence, and preferably both"). 
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excelled at discerning the purposes and effects of restraints that, in 
hindsight, were quite beneficial. 103 The process of justifying restraints 
posited by proponents of the quick look rests upon a particularly optimis-
tic view of human rationality, in which defendants understand exactly 
what they are doing and why, and march into the courtroom or agency 
and explain themselves to an open-minded commissioner or judge. The 
real world is quite different, however. Often defendants themselves have 
difficulty discerning and articulating the purpose of this or that arrange-
ment in a manner useful for antitrust analysis. 104 Firms are simply collec-
tions of individuals, who adopt practices and then move on-or retire. 
Efficient practices-and the firms that adopt them-will survive, even if 
firms cannot "remember" why they were adopted. 105 Requiring proof 
103 For instance, the United States confidently asserted that the restraints at issue in 
Schwinn and "White Motors produced no benefits, despite significant contemporaneous 
scholarly commentary to the contrary. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 41, at 429-52; Robert L. 
Jordan, Exclusive and Restricted Sales Areas Under the Antitrust Laws, 9 UCLA L. REv. Ill 
(1962); Telser, supra note 41, at 89-96; see also WILLIAMSON, supra note 23, at 185 n.22 
(noting that he "expressly took exception with the Schwinn brief while it was in prepa-
ration"). 
104 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Allocating Antitrust Decisionmaking Tasks, 76 GEo. LJ. 305, 
308 (1987) ("Often it takes a decade or more to determine what a business practice really 
does; law moves too fast for its own good, because courts act in advance of the arrival of 
explanation. Judges move slower than markets but faster than the economics profession, 
a deadly combination."). It should be noted that Judge Easterbrook's assessment of the 
prowess of economists may be unduly optimistic. It took economists several decades to 
identify the beneficial purposes of minimum resale price maintenance, for instance. See, 
e.g., William Breit, Resale Price Maintenance: "What Do Economists Know and "When Did They 
Know It?, 147 j. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 72, 84-86 (1991). 
105 Judge Easterbrook has described this phenomenon well: 
Wisdom lags far behind the market. It is useful for many purposes to think of 
market behavior as random. Firms try dozens of practices. Most of them are 
flops, and the firms must try something else or disappear. Other practices offer 
something extra to consumers-they reduce costs or improve quality-and so 
they survive. In a competitive struggle the firms that use the best practices survive. 
Mistakes are buried. 
Why do particular practices work? The firms that selected the practices may 
or may not know what is special about them. They can describe what they do, 
but the why is more difficult. Only someone with a very detailed knowledge of 
the market process, as well as the time and data needed for evaluation, would 
be able to answer that question. Sometimes no one can answer it. 
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1, 5 (1984). See also Kattan, 
supra note 18, at 627-28. Indeed, as Armen Alchian explained, many business practices 
are simply the result of imitation of those practices pursued by other firms. Armen A. 
Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. PoL. EcoN. 211, 218-19 (1950) 
("While there certainly are those who consciously innovate, there are those who, in their 
imperfect attempts to imitate others, unconsciously innovate by unwittingly acquiring some 
unexpected or unsought unique attributes which under the prevailing circumstances prove 
partly responsible for their success. Others, in turn, will attempt to copy the uniqueness, 
and the imitation-innovation process continues."). Of course, imitators may not always be 
able to explain the benefits of a practice about which they knew little in the first place. 
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that a practice produces this or that benefit will inevitably extinguish 
some practices, before economists or others can discern their purpose. 106 
Indeed, even when firms and their counsel fully articulate the benefits 
of an agreement, such explanation can fall on deaf ears. Here Topco 
itself provides a useful example, in which the defendants (and the trial 
judge) explained in plain, understandable English just why exclusive 
territories were necessary to induce appropriate levels of investment in 
promotion of the Topco products. 107 Despite this explanation, which 
found support in the scholarly literature, the United States persisted in 
its attack on Topco, and the Supreme Court joined in. 108 
To be sure, today's courts and enforcement agencies are more sophisti-
cated than those of 1968 or 1972. Yet we have not reached some economic 
106 See Kolasky, supra note 81, at 45 ("[R]equir[ing] parties to come forth with a full-
blown efficiencies defense ... in every case, no matter how remote the danger to competi-
tion, [creates] a real danger that fear of antitrust prosecution will chill procompetitive 
collaborations among competitors."). 
107 See Brief for Topco Associates, Inc. at 22-23, United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 
596 (1972) (No. 70-82). Portions of this argument are worth quoting in full: 
Judge Will determined that the licensing provisions are "ancillary and subordi-
nate" to the achievement of Topco's objective because they permit each member 
to undertake the development of his private labels in his trading area and to 
build an identification of these brands with his stores. If at some future time the 
value each member would give to his private labels could be appropriated by 
others and thereby destroyed, the private labels would no longer serve their 
particular and important competitive purpose. The potential Topco member, 
who needs a private label program truly private like those of his stronger rivals, 
would be unwilling to undertake the substantial investment in a cooperative 
program that would not fulfill his need. 
!d. at 22-23. 
108 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), provides another example in 
which the defendants could not have been more clear in their assertion that the restraints 
at issue-vertically imposed exclusive territories-were necessary to prevent free riding. 
In particular, they asserted that 
Where, as here, there is vigorous interbrand competition, the goods being sold 
are very expensive, requiring constant service, and distributors and dealers must 
make an immense capital investment in inventory and plant out of their own 
pockets (the average value of business assets owned by White distributors and 
dealers is over $250,000), territorial limitations are particularly beneficial. See 
Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 795, 
809-13 (1962) ;Jordan, Exclusive and Restrictive Sales Areas Under the Antitrust Laws, 
9 U.C.L.A. Rev. Ill, 152-55 (1962) .... 
White, on the strength of this kind of contract, and in reliance on the cases 
sustaining its legality, has built up substantial good will in its organization of 
independent dealers and distributors. The contracts assure that White dealers 
will have the resources to scour their respective areas for hard-to-get sales, since 
they will have the security of getting the easier, larger-volume White customers 
in their areas. And dealers who have spent valuable time "pre-selling" a customer-
i.e., softening him up for a White sale instead of a G.M. or Ford sale-will not 
lose the legitimate reward of their labor to another White dealer who jumps 
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Nirvana, where lawyers and judges fully internalize all the niceties of 
transaction cost economics. 109 The Department of Justice, for instance, 
continues to enforce the per se rules against tying and minimum resale 
price maintenance, even though economists and others have exploded 
the economic premises of these doctrines. 110 Even professional econo-
territorial boundaries at a strategic moment and snatches away the pre-sold 
customer. 
Such "an attempt to pick off the best accounts-to 'skim the cream,"' Note, 
Restricted Channels of Distrilmtion Under the Sherman Act, supra, at 811, is particularly 
undesirable because it weakens White's over-all dealer organization. Individual 
dealers need the "cream" not only in order to be able to sell "less lucrative 
accounts," ibid., but also in order to have the financial strength to maintain 
adequate service facilities. White trucks travel constantly across the nation. Their 
drivers have to count on strong service departments at convenient intervals along 
the way. If such service is not forthcoming, the drivers' employers will, quite 
naturally, stop buying White trucks. White's primary purpose is not to insulate 
dealers from competition for their own benefit, but to keep the dealers strong, 
in order to protect and maintain White's own business and reputation and 
increase competition with other manufacturers. 
Brief for White Motor Co. at 42-43, White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963) 
(No. 54). Despite this argument, the United States persisted in its assertion that exclusive 
territories were unlawful per se. 
109 For instance, the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission has suggested that the 
Supreme Court reached the correct result in Topco because the venture could have pre-
vented free riding via less restrictive methods than exclusive territories, namely "primary 
responsibility or profit pass-over clauses." See Robert Pitofsky, A Framework for Antitrust 
Analysis of joint Ventures, 74 CEo. LJ. 1605, 1621 (1986). Less restrictive alternatives, 
however, are very often both less effective and more expensive to administer than an 
airtight exclusive territory. See Meese, Price Theory, supra note 23, at 189-95; WILLIAMSON, 
supra note 23, at 187. Primary responsibility clauses merely require firms to serve particular 
areas first, without precluding firms from serving other areas as well. Thus, firms bound 
by such clauses could serve their primary areas and then proceed to serve other areas as 
well, free riding on the efforts of the firms with primary responsibility over those areas. 
See Bork, supra note 41, at 467-68. Profit pass-over clauses would require a firm that 
invaded another's primary territory to compensate the incumbent for sales made in that 
territory. Administration of such clauses would presumably have required the cooperative 
to incur the cost of calculating members' sales of Topco brands on a store-by-store basis. 
Even if such administration were costless, this arrangement would still be inferior to an 
exclusive territory, as firms would have to predict the output of their competitors before 
deciding how much to invest in promoting the products in question. Absent perfect 
foresight, firms would make erroneous predictions and thus might over or under-invest 
in promotion. By creating property rights in sales to customers within a particular region, 
an exclusive territory ensures that firms need only predict their own sales when deciding 
how much to invest in promotion. See generally F.A. Hayek, Economics and Knowledge, reprinted 
in INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 35-39 (F.A. Hayek ed., 1948) (several individual 
plans cannot all achieve their object if based on conflicting assumptions about how other 
individuals will behave). Thus, adoption of a "more restrictive" alternative was perfectly 
consistent with Topco's assertion that exclusive territories advanced consumer welfare 
more than any other alternatives. 
110 See Meese, Tying, supra note 44, at 61-94; Telser, supra note 41, at 89-96. 
To be sure, enforcement agencies may claim to be "bound" to enforce decisions like 
Dr. Miles and jefferson Parish so long as they are "on the books." In other contexts, however, 
these same agencies have refused to enforce precedents no longer consistent with prevailing 
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mists find it difficult to keep up with the latest developments in their 
field. Ill Can we really expect enforcers and judges to maintain a knowl-
edge of economic theory and technique sufficiently catholic to equip 
them regularly to understand the actual effects of practices-many of 
them unfamiliar-about which they are already "suspicious?" Economic 
paradigms shift slowly, even within the profession itself. 112 Enforcers and 
the courts are often the last to hear about such changes. 
Requiring proponents to offer significant evidence of the benefits of 
"inherently suspect" restraints is an unjustified departure from conven-
tional rule of reason analysis. Explanation will be costly, and some 
restraints will be inexplicable. Application of a quick look approach 
will thus produce an unacceptable number of false positives, depriving 
consumers of the benefits of numerous restraints. Moreover, the con-
demnation of such agreements will drive them underground, depriving 
courts and economists of the opportunity to consider the restraints in 
light of new learning. 113 There is, of course, only one way to gain the 
information necessary to categorize such restraints properly: full-blown 
economic wisdom. For instance, the Antitrust Division has in the past simply refused to 
enforce the Robinson-Patman Act. See Easterbrook, supra note 23, at 711. Moreover, in 
1968, the Division promulgated Merger Guidelines that indicated that the Division would 
not proceed against many mergers that were unlawful under then-current precedents. See 
id. at 711-12 & n.30. Thus, current enforcement officials should not feel bound to enforce 
Jefferson Parish or Dr. Miles. The Sherman Act after all, creates a common law of antitrust, 
and this common law is not the exclusive province of judges. The enforcement agencies 
may exercise their discretion by refusing to pursue cases that, if won, would be detrimental 
to the welfare of consumers. See Baxter, supra note 64, at 686-88. This is not to say that 
the agencies should refuse to bring tying or minimum resale price maintenance cases. 
Such cases, however, should be litigated under the rule of reason. 
111 Consider this: every scholar working in antitrust and industrial organization 
believes that a majority of other scholars do not understand-even hold perverse 
views on-the topics about which he knows the most. If you do not believe it, 
reread the papers delivered at this conference. I need not draw out implications 
for the ability of generalist judges to give correct answers to knotty questions 
arising out of novel business practices. 
None of this is the least bit surprising; disagreement and uncertainty is an 
outcome of the division of labor among scholars. No one can be "up" on even 
a large fraction of the work going on in industrial organization. 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Ignorance and Antitrust 119, 121, reprinted in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION 
AND COMPETITIVENESS (Thomas M. Jorde & David j. Teece eds., 1992). 
112 Max Planck was even more pessimistic about the ability of superior theories to win 
converts: "[A] new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and 
making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new 
generation grows up that is familiar with it." Max Planck, Scientific Autobiography and Other 
Papers, 33-34 (trans. F. Grayner 1949) (quoted in KuHN, supra note 96, at 151). One need 
not entirely share Planck's pessimism to argue that resistance to new theories often leads 
courts and enforcement agencies to condemn procompetitive contracts, and that this 
danger is heightened under a quick look approach. 
113 See Easterbrook, supra note 105, at 6-7. 
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rule of reason scrutiny in an environment receptive to claims that such 
restraints may, in fact, further competition. 114 Without such full consider-
ation, neither courts nor scholars can make confident assertions that 
these agreements are, in fact, "inherently suspect" as proponents of the 
quick look employ that term. 
In sum, there is no reason to treat horizontal restraints not deemed 
unlawful per se any differently from mergers. All such transactions or 
restraints eliminate price competition and, for that matter, trader free-
dom. The only difference between the two transactions lies in the extent 
of integration and thus the "location" of the efficiencies that might 
be produced. Mergers involve a complete integration of assets (and a 
permanent elimination of competition) and thus the possible creation 
of technological efficiencies realized "within" a firm. On the other hand, 
contractual integration produces a temporary limitation on competition 
and can generate non-technological efficiencies, usually the elimination 
or reduction of opportunistic behavior. The persistence of and support 
for the quick look doctrine necessarily reflects a hostility toward efficien-
cies that are generated by contract, outside of the firm. Such hostility, 
of course, is an artifact of the applied price theory tradition of industrial 
organization, a tradition rejected in Sylvania. There is no basis for favor-
ing one sort of efficiency over the other. 115 
IV. (RE) DEFINING THE SCOPE AND CONTENT OF 
THE RULE OF REASON 
The analysis thus far leaves two open questions. First, how should 
courts draw the line between horizontal restraints subject to rule of 
reason treatment, on the one hand, and those that should be per se 
unlawful, on the other? Second, assuming that rule of reason treatment 
is appropriate for a particular restraint, what sort of burden should 
plaintiffs have to discharge before shifting the burden of production to 
the defendants? 
On the first question, it would be tempting to embrace the ancillary 
restraints test announced by Judge Taft and endorsed by Thomas Arthur 
in this Symposium. 116 That is, one could ask whether the restraints at 
114 See HovENKAMP, supra note 17, at 485 (arguing that courts should examine minimum 
resale price maintenance under the rule of reason because "[b]oth legal policy makers 
and economists learn a great deal from studying the records of business litigation"). 
115 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,466-67 (1992) 
("Legal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than actual market realities 
are generally disfavored in antitrust law."). 
116 See Thomas C. Arthur, A Workable Rule of Reason: A Less Ambitious Antitrust Role for the 
Federal Courts, 68 ANTITRUST LJ. 337, 338-39 (2000); see also United States v. Addyston 
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898) (Taft,].), affd as modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
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issue accompany and plausibly promote a sale transaction or integration 
of assets. 117 Certainly satisfaction of this test should be sufficient to avoid 
per se treatment. But, should it be necessary? I would suggest not: Some 
horizontal restraints on price or output should be analyzed under the 
rule of reason even if there is no accompanying sale transaction or 
combination of productive assets. 
Consider in this connection the Ivy League's agreement eliminating 
competition on levels of financial aid. 118 Certainly these restraints are 
not "ancillary" to some other purpose in the way that Professor Arthur 
or Judge Taft would use that term. According to some, these restraints 
are cartel price fixing, plain and simple. Yet, another possibility suggests 
that rule of reason treatment is appropriate-that is, the Ivy League's 
restraints may be designed to overcome the market failure that would 
result from unbridled price competition among the schools in question. 
In particular, all-out competition for potential students based solely 
upon their academic merit may result in student bodies that are unduly 
homogeneous, i.e., lack the sort of socio-economic diversity that all 
students might value. 119 Such diversity, of course, costs money, in the 
form of financial aid needed to attract and retain diverse students. 
Competition that drives the price paid by non-diverse students to the 
marginal cost of providing the education in question deprives schools 
of the resources necessary to assemble a diverse student body. The result, 
it is said, would be a "lemons" equilibrium-low prices, but sub-optimal 
quality as well. 120 Proof that the Overlap Group has fixed prices, then, 
should not end the inquiry; instead, the Group should be allowed to 
adduce evidence that these restrictions actually enhance the welfare of 
all students. 121 
117 Arthur, supra note 116, at 374-83. See also Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., 776 
F.2d 185, 189 (7th Cir. 1985) (asking whether challenged restraints "are part of a larger 
endeavor whose success they promote"). 
118 See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Brief Amicus 
Curiae for the Association of Alumni and Alumnae of the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology in Support of Appellant at 11-14, United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658 
(3d Cir. 1993) (No. 92-1911). 
119 See Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 674 (describing this purported benefit). 
120 See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market For "Lemons": QJ.tality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 QJ. EcoN. 89 (1970). 
121 Of course, mere proof that the restraint creates substantial benefits would not itself 
establish that the arrangement is reasonable. Under current law, a plaintiff could still 
prevail by showing that adoption of a less restrictive alternative would generate the same 
benefits. See 7 AREEDA, supra note 12, ~ 1507b, at 397. Where the Ivy Overlap Group is 
concerned, one could argue that individual schools could have achieved the objective in 
question without collective action by competing "on the merits," i.e., by disclosing to 
potential students the extent of diversity at their respective institutions and charging non-
needy students the tuition necessary to accomplish that diversity. See Alan]. Meese, Antitrust 
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To be sure, even under this most charitable interpretation, the Ivy 
League's restraints resemble, as Professor Arthur points out, consumer 
protection self-regulation by interested parties. 122 Yet this characteriza-
tion should not be damning. Here franchising provides a useful analogy. 
Antitrust scholars have long been in the habit of characterizing franchise 
contracts as vertical restraints. And this characterization is tolerable for 
those franchise contracts that are "ancillary" to a manufacturer's sale of 
goods to its dealers. But many franchises are of a business format variety 
under which the franchisee produces the franchise product. 123 These 
arrangements involve an agreement among actual or potential competi-
tors-franchisees-on what products to offer and how and where to 
offer them. Having agreed to these terms, franchisees then appoint an 
agent-the franchisor-to monitor and enforce compliance with 
them. 124 Many of these contractual terms would be per se unlawful if 
adopted on their own, and not as part of a franchise contract. 125 Neverthe-
Balancing in a (Near) Coasean World: The Case of Franchise Tying Contracts, 95 MICH. L. REv. 
111, 162-63 (1996) [hereinafter Meese, Franchise Tying Contracts] (suggesting that such a 
less restrictive alternative would suffice in these circumstances). While disclosure of a 
school's diversity characteristics would entail some minimal cost, there is no reason to 
suspect that this cost would be greater than the costs of administering the Overlap Group; 
it may even be lower. If, in fact, the presence of diversity did enhance the quality of 
education for non-needy students to the extent claimed, one would expect that such 
students would be willing to pay the additional tuition necessary to support it. 
It should be noted that the Overlap defendants claimed that such unilateral pursuit of 
diversity would be less successful than collective pursuit because there would be "constant 
pressure from various segments of the university to use school resources to attract the 
most desirable students." Brief For Massachusetts Institute of Technology at 36, United 
States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993) (No. 92-19ll). This argument seems to 
rest on a recognition that non-needy "most desirable students" would not be willing to 
incur the cost necessary to subsidize the diversity sought by the Overlap Group, i.e., that 
the financial aid policies at issue would not survive in a well-functioning, competitive 
market. See generally National Soc'y of Prof! Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692-96 
( 1978). Cf Alan J. Meese, Monopoly Bundling in Cyberspace: How Many Products Does Microsoft 
Sell?, 44 ANTITRUST BuLL. 65, 114-15 ( 1999) (proof of market failure necessary to justify 
contractual restrictions on purchasers). 
122 See Arthur, supra note 116, at 379 n.263. 
123 See Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348, 1353 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(distinguishing between "business format" and "distribution" franchise systems); Principe 
v. McDonald's Corp., 631 F.2d 303, 305-ll (4th Cir. 1980). 
124 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 23, at 181-82 (characterizing franchise contract in this 
manner); HovENKAMP, supra note 17, at 205 ("[R)estauranteurs scattered across a wide 
area might develop joint menus, building plans, and methods of doing business, and then 
promote their 'chain' nationally. This national name recognition will enable them to 
reach traveling customers that might otherwise avoid a local restaurant about which they 
know nothing. The Topco case ... involved such a venture."). See also Paul H. Rubin, The 
Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract, 21 J.L. & EcoN. 223 (1978). 
125 For instance, an agreement between fast food franchisors to offer chicken but not 
pizza, or to offer Coke but not Pepsi, would eliminate a significant form of nonprice 
competition between the parties, as would "an agreement among automobile manufactur-
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less, courts accord such restraints full-blown rule of reason treatment. 
This is not because such restraints are "vertical" or "ancillary" in any 
meaningful sense. 126 It is instead because, regardless of labels, such 
restraints can serve procompetitive purposes, often by combating the 
sort of market failure that would result from unbridled competition. 127 
In the same way, horizontal restraints, such as the ones imposed by the 
Overlap Group, can prevent market failure and thus should be analyzed 
under the rule of reason. 128 Instead of asking whether a restraint is 
ancillary or not, courts and agencies should ask whether the restraint 
creates the sort of benefits that are cognizable under the Sherman Act.129 
ers to use plastic rather than leather for their seatcovers." See HovENKAMP, supra note 17, 
at 259. 
126 One could argue that such restraints are ancillary to the licensing of a trademark. 
However, the existence of a trademark created by actual or potential competitors does 
not transform an otherwise horizontal restraint into a vertical one. No one would suggest 
that members of the Ivy League could have avoided the "horizontal" label in Brown 
University by appending an "Ivy League" trademark to their literature and website. Similarly, 
franchisees are no less actual or potential competitors because they operate under a 
trademark they have created. 
127 See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51-59 (1977); 
Rubin, supra note 124, at 227-29 (arguing that franchise contractual restrictions combat 
market failure). 
128 See Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 221-23 (D.C. 
Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.) (finding, under full-blown rule of reason analysis, that horizontal 
price restraint among independent participants in moving company joint venture produced 
significant benefits). 
129 Cf Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Per se Violations in Antitrust Law: Confusing Offenses with 
Defenses, 77 CEo. LJ. 165 (1989) (declaration that practice is "per se" unlawful necessarily 
reflects conclusion that certain classes of justification are not cognizable under the Sher-
man Act); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282-84 (6th Cir. 1898) 
(Taft, j.) (assertion that prices were reasonable not cognizable under the Act), affd as 
modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
Some may argue that the approach suggested here is inconsistent with the original 
meaning of the Sherman Act as articulated by Judge Taft in Addyston Pipe. But Taft 
himself departed from the results mandated by the common law he invoked. See HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAw 285-87 (1991) (showing that Taft's 
approach was inconsistent with common law decisions enforcing horizontal agreements 
fixing reasonable prices); see also, e.g., Dolph v. Troy Laundry Mach. Co., 28 F. 553, 555-56 
(C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1886) (sustaining horizontal restraint on prices and output), rev'd on other 
grounds, 138 U.S. 617 (1891). In so doing, Taft simply applied the principle animating 
the Sherman Act-concern for consumer welfare-in light of changes in economic theory 
suggesting that private cartels could, in fact, raise prices above the competitive level. See 
Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 291-93 (finding that prices charged by defendants were unreason-
able); Meese, Liberty and Antitrust, supra note 20, at 66-67 (suggesting that the Supreme 
Court took a similar approach). The framework suggested here follows in the tradition 
Taft initiated, i.e., applies advances in economic theory to distinguish between those 
restraints that may enhance consumer welfare and those that will not. See Business Elecs. 
Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 731-32 (1988) ("The term 'restraint of trade' 
in the statute, like the term at common law, refers not to a particular list of agreements, 
but to a particular economic consequence, which may be produced by quite different 
sorts of agreements in varying times and circumstances .... The Sherman Act adopted 
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Horizontal restraints that plausibly produce such efficiencies should be 
judged under the rule of reason, regardless of whether they are 
"ancillary. "130 
This brings us to the second question raised above, namely, what sort 
of proof should suffice to establish a prima facie case under the rule of 
reason? If the merger analogy holds, and there is no obvious reason that 
it does not, plaintiffs should be required to prove the contours of a 
relevant market in which the restraint in question purportedly enhances 
the defendant's market power. 131 Moreover, plaintiffs should establish 
just how the challenged restraint operates to confer market power on 
the defendant. Absent such proof, courts can properly assume that the 
restraint under challenge is generally beneficial or benign. 132 This is not 
to say that plaintiffs must always establish that the defendant possesses 
market power of the sort necessary to a claim of monopolization. Some 
restraints may themselves allow a firm to raise the costs of its rivals' 
inputs, and thus price above its own costs, even if the firm could not 
the term 'restraint of trade' along with its dynamic potential. It invokes the common law 
itself, and not merely the static content that the common law had assigned to the term 
in 1890.") (citation omitted). 
130 BMI, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. I, 23 (1979) ("Not all arrangements among actual 
or potential competitors that have an impact on price are per se violations of the Sherman 
Act or even unreasonable restraints. Mergers among competitors eliminate competition, 
including price competition, but they are not per se illegal, and many of them withstand 
attack under any existing antitrust standard .... "); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United 
States, 288 U.S. 344, 376 (1933) ("[N)o valid objection could have been interposed under 
the Sherman Act if the defendants had eliminated competition between themselves by a 
complete integration of their mining properties in a single ownership. We agree that 
there is no ground for holding defendants' plan illegal merely because they have not 
integrated their properties and have chosen to maintain their independent plants, seeking 
not to limit but rather to facilitate production.") (citation omitted). 
m See, e.g., Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 189 (7th Cir. 1985). Of 
course, courts usually have little choice but to rely upon inferences drawn from market 
shares in merger cases, as plaintiffs often challenge such transactions before they have 
occurred, thus making so-called direct proof of anticompetitive effects impossible. One 
could therefore argue that the law of mergers does not really provide support for this 
article's argument that proof of power in a relevant market should be necessary before 
a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case under the rule of reason. 
In this connection it should be noted that§ 7 of the Clayton Act applies to all mergers, 
whether or not they have been consummated. See United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours 
& Co., 353 U.S. 586, 588, 607-08 (1957) (voiding stock purchase under§ 7 that occurred 
in 1917-1919). Moreover, neither the 1992 Merger Guidelines (as amended in 1997) nor 
any case law of which I am aware dispenses with the market power inquiry in cases where 
the merger under review has already occurred and a plaintiff can purportedly prove direct 
effects. Thus, it would appear that merger law is entirely consistent with the proposal 
offered here. 
1 ~2 See Rothery Storage, 792 F.2d at 221; Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 191 ("Unless the firms have 
the power to raise price by curtailing output, their agreement is unlikely to harm consumers, 
and it makes sense to understand their cooperation as benign or beneficial."). 
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otherwise affect prices in its market by reducing output. 133 Plaintiffs 
should be free to prove that market conditions are such that a challenged 
agreement does, in fact, raise rivals' costs in this manner. 134 
Admittedly, the requirement that plaintiffs prove the contours of a 
relevant market appears inconsistent with some Supreme Court case law. 
As Mark Patterson has shown in this Symposium, some case law suggests 
that plaintiffs can establish a prima facie case simply by proving the 
existence of anticompetitive effects, such as an increase in price or 
reduction in quality. 135 Indeed, one could even read NCAA to require 
proof of such effects as part of a quick look analysis. 136 Supreme Court 
doctrine, however, does not reflect consistent solicitude for consumer 
welfare in light of modern economic theory; the Justices are still working 
out the full implications of Sylvania's rejection of Populism and price 
theory. 137 Even after Sylvania, it still took nineteen years for the Court 
to overrule Albrecht's per se ban on maximum resale price maintenance. 138 
Moreover, even after Sylvania, the Court has continued to adhere to 
rules, such as the per se ban on certain tying contracts, that cannot 
withstand a post-price theory analysis. 139 Like Albrecht and Jefferson Parish, 
decisions that allow plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case based solely 
on "direct evidence" of anticompetitive effects are misguided, resting, 
as they do, on the sort of price-theoretic assumptions that informed 
133 See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising 
Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE LJ. 209, 251 (1986) ("[A) firm need not 
enjoy or acquire traditional market power to gain the ability to price above pre-exclusionary-
rights competitive levels."); Meese, Franchise Tying Contracts, supra note 121, at 145-46 
(describing a raising rivals' cost strategy by a franchisor without market power in market 
for the franchise product). 
134 Such proof will not be easy, however. Among other things, a plaintiff would have to 
show that the input market in question is sufficiently concentrated to support such a 
strategy. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 133, at 240-42; cf. Paddock Publications, 
Inc. v. Chicago Tribune Co., 103 F.3d 42, 45 (7th Cir. 1996) (exclusive contracts cannot 
support downstream collusion absent concentration in the input market). See generally 
Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 133, at 267 ("Certainly, in most industries, exclusionary 
rights contracts cannot be profitably employed for anticompetitive ends."). 
155 See Mark R. Patterson, The Role of Power in the Rule of Reason, 68 ANTITRUST LJ. 429, 
432 (2000); see also FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986); 
Competitor Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 18, § 3.31 ("If anticompetitive harm is 
found, examination of market power ordinarily is not required."). 
136 See supra note 16. 
137 See generally Meese, Economic Theory, supra note 70; Thomas C. Arthur, "Formalistic Line 
Drawing:" Exclusion of Unautharized Servicers from Single Brand Aftermarkets Under Kodak and 
Sylvania, 24 J. CoRP. L. 603, 625-32 (1999) (arguing that Kodak's treatment of certain 
distribution restraints is inconsistent with approach taken by Sylvania). 
138 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10-15 (1997) (describing how Sylvania under-
mined premises of Al!Jrecht). 
139 See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. 
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Schwinn and Topco. Direct proof of anticompetitive effects is, in fact, 
quite illusory, and should not by itself cast any sort of burden on the 
proponent of a restraint. More precisely, proof that a restraint raises 
prices above their previous level may be equally consistent with a defen-
dant's assertion that the restraint produces significant benefits by, for 
instance, curing a market failure. 
Consider again the case of the Ivy Overlap Group. Under a "direct 
effects" approach, proof that the arrangement produces prices higher 
than they otherwise would have been would suffice to establish a prima 
facie case, thus casting a burden of production onto the defendant. Yet, 
such a price increase is also entirely consistent with the defendants' 
account of the purposes and hoped-for effects of the restraints. "Lemons" 
equilibria are characterized by reductions in quality and price: the point 
of these restraints-at least according to the defendants-was to correct 
the market failure that unbridled competition would have produced. 140 
Proof that the restraints led to higher tuition may simply indicate that 
they did, in fact, improve the quality of the education offered by the 
parties to it, and that matriculants were willing to pay for that quality in 
the form of higher prices. 141 Market power consists of the ability to 
price above cost, and improved products sometimes cost more than their 
predecessors. Thus, proof that a restraint increases prices is entirely 
consistent with the assertion that the restraint induced cost-justified price 
increases and does not reflect any exercise of market power. 142 Such 
proof should not, by itself, establish a prima facie case under the rule 
of reason. 143 
140 Cf California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771-73 (1999). 
141 See Easterbrook, supra note Ill, at 127 ("[M)onopoly and efficiency explanations so 
often imply similar traits. Think of vertical restrictions within a dealership network. If 
these monopolize, the price rises and output falls. If the restraints cause dealers to supply 
efficient point-of-sale services delivered to consumers, again price rises, and quantity may 
fall (although consumers' surplus would rise because they value the higher quality)."); 
William F. Baxter, Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 75 CAL. L. REv. 933, 945-46 (1987): 
Higher retail prices are entirely consistent with the benign explanation of resale 
price maintenance. Imposition of [resale price maintenance) reflects a judgment 
on the part of the brand owner that her products will compete more successfully, 
both against other branded products and against generic rivals, if the retailer 
competes along parameters other than price. And the retailer's expenses of 
engaging in those other forms of rivalry are financed by setting a retail margin 
higher than would prevail if retail price competition were allowed or encouraged. 
142 Cf Meese, Tying, supra note 44, at 69-70 (cost-justified price differential that induces 
purchaser to accept tying contract does not reflect exercise of market power). 
143 The Commission's opinion in California Dental Association also illustrates the danger 
of relying solely upon "direct proof' to establish a prima facie case under the rule of 
reason. There the Commission relied upon evidence that certain firms used advertising 
to increase their sales to conclude that bans on such advertising were presumptively 
anticompetitive. See California Dental Ass'n, 121 F.T.C. 190, 310-ll (1996), affd, 128 F.3d 
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Ultimately, reliance upon "direct effects" to establish a prima facie 
case rests upon an outmoded price-theoretic definition of "competition." 
Under this paradigm, bargaining and information costs do not exist, 
and competition takes the form of constant rivalry between firms, unham-
pered by contractual integration. 144 Such rivalry produces a "competitive" 
price, and restraints that alter that price or depart from the model of 
atomistic competition are presumptively "anticompetitive." 145 
In the real world, competition takes a different form. Bargaining and 
information costs do exist, and market failure can sometimes result. Many 
contracts and practices inexplicable under a price-theoretic definition of 
"competition" are in fact attempts to overcome market failure and thus 
better approximate the result that perfect competition would, in fact, 
produce. 146 In this real world, there is no reason to presume that prices 
or other conditions that existed before a restraint was adopted were 
"competitive" in any relevant sense, any more than were the prices that 
existed in the state of nature. 147 Indeed, one suspects that market failures, 
as well as the attempts to solve such failures by contract, are far more 
prevalent than market power of the sort necessary to do any appreciable 
harm to consumers. 148 Thus, proof that a restraint creates prices different 
from those that prevailed before the restraint is at least equally consistent 
with the hypothesis that the arrangement furthers competition and thus 
720 (9th Cir. 1997), vacated, 526 U.S. 756 (1999). This evidence, however, was equally 
consistent with the Association's assertion that such advertising was inherently misleading 
and that regulation of members' advertising was therefore necessary to forestall a "lemons" 
equilibrium. See California Dtmtal Association, 526 U.S. at 771-73. The whole point of false 
advertising, after all, is to increase one's sales. 
144 See supra notes 23-25, 39-40 and accompanying text. See also Hayek, supra note 109, 
at 94-99 (contending that then-modem economic theory began with various assumptions 
of the model of perfect competition and thus had no explanation for numerous real 
world business practices); id. at 94 (asserting that "most [conditions of the perfect competi-
tion model] are equally assumed in the discussion of various 'imperfect' or 'monopolistic' 
markets, which throughout assume certain unrealistic 'perfections."'). 
145 See ITC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 321 (1966) (condemning exclusive dealing 
contract because it "take[s] away freedom of purchasers to buy in an open market"). 
146 See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text; HAYEK, supra note 109, at 96 (noting 
that because of its various unrealistic assumptions, '"perfect' competition means indeed 
the absence of all competitive activities"). 
147 Cf Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 411 (1904) (Holmes,]., dissent-
ing) (Sherman Act should not be read to "make eternal the bellum omnium contra omnes 
and disintegrate society so far as it could into individual atoms"); Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest 
City Enters., 776 F.2d. 185, 188 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The war of all against all is not a good 
model for any economy. Antitrust law is designed to ensure an appropriate blend of 
cooperation and competition, not to require all economic actors to compete full tilt at 
every moment."). 
148 See Coase, supra note 23, at 26 ("The fact that there are transaction costs and that 
they are large implies that many effects of peoples' actions will not be covered by market 
transactions. Consequently, 'externalities' will be ubiquitous." (footnote omitted)); Wit.-
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cannot support a presumption of anticompetitive harm. 149 A requirement 
that plaintiffs prove market power, on the other hand, will ensure that 
a presumption of anticompetitive effects only arises in those instances 
where there is a significant possibility of consumer harm. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Most business contracts enhance consumer welfare, and horizontal 
agreements are no exception. Cooperation is the basis of most productive 
activity, and much cooperation requires agreements between actual or 
potential competitors. Sometimes these agreements involve a total fusion 
of assets and talents, as when individuals form a partnership or corpora-
tion, or when two firms merge. Such arrangements are properly analyzed 
under the rule of reason, and plaintiffs must prove that conditions in 
the relevant market will support an anticompetitive scheme before cast-
ing any burden of production on the defendant. 
Complete fusion of assets and talent is not always a reasonable mode 
of cooperation, however. The members of the NCAA cannot merge so 
as to eliminate the market failures that would result from unbridled 
competition for athletes, for instance. Thus, some beneficial cooperation 
takes the form of horizontal agreements between firms that are otherwise 
independent competitors in the marketplace. Like a total fusion of assets, 
such agreements often advance the welfare of consumers, as they can 
eliminate the sort of market failures that would beset unbridled competi-
tion. Nevertheless, case law and enforcement policy treat many such 
restraints as "inherently suspect" without any market analysis, even if 
they might plausibly produce the sort of efficiencies ordinarily cognizable 
under the Sherman Act. 
This essay has shown that the current hostility toward restraints deemed 
"inherently suspect" under a quick look approach cannot be justified, 
resting, as it does, on an approach reminiscent of Topco and the applied 
price theory tradition of antitrust. Developments in economic theory 
suggest that many horizontal restraints once deemed anticompetitive 
are, in fact, examples of partial contractual integration designed to 
overcome the sort of market failures that unbridled competition can 
produce. In light of these developments, courts and the enforcement 
LIAMSON, supra note 23, at 28 ("[t] he transaction cost literature also maintains the rebutta-
ble presumption that nonstandard forms of contracting have efficiency purposes."). 
149 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466--67 (1992) 
(legal presumptions must rest on actual market realities); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. 
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-98 (1986) (court cannot draw inference of 
anticompetitive conduct from evidence equally consistent with procompetitive explana-
tion); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761-64 (1984) (same). 
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agencies should analyze such restraints under a full-blown rule of reason, 
as they are conceptually no different from horizontal mergers and other 
complete integrations. Such treatment should not be reserved for 
restraints that are "ancillary" to a venture or transaction, but instead 
should apply to any restraint that might plausibly produce efficiencies 
of the sort that are cognizable under the Sherman Act. Moreover, plain-
tiffs who challenge such restraints should bear the same burden currently 
shouldered by those who challenge horizontal mergers, i.e., proof that 
market conditions and concentration are conducive to the sort of anti-
competitive effects purportedly produced by the agreement under 
scrutiny. 
